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Chaos Mesh – Cloud Native Chaos Engineering

Thu, 30 Jun 2022 21:49:00 -0400

In this post, we discuss the resilience test problem and why chaos mesh emerged. Then we go over a lab of chaos mesh with a few experiments.

The Problem

I used to support a server application installed in customer’s data centre. The server application receives data from client application, cleanse the data and put them on customer-managed storage. Unfortunately, the customer-managed storage system hang up from time to time. When this happens, the application does not get an I/O failure to begin with so it continues to serve client traffic with many threads pending for I/O completion. All the threads will fail eventually after a long, unresponsive pause.

What is really bad, is that the server application first acknowledges the client application of the recipient of their data, and then asynchronously archive them to the customer’s storage. In this case, the client applications think they securely send out the data upon receiving acknowledgement. However, the server application lost the data afterwards because it does not interact with storage system in a fail-safe fashion. As a result, I often find myself in the business of restoring client data from the cache directory on the servers, and grumbling about how the quality process allowed this issue slipped into production.

To be fair, this is not an easy catch in the quality assurance process. It is caused by a hardware issue, which is technically the customer’s own problem. However, it is the vendor’s responsibility to design fault-tolerant software. Further, if we put on the site reliability engineering goggle, we see vendor’s software and customer’s hardware as a whole, instead of two disparate silos. The problem is however, how we emulate this kind of fault in house?

Chaos Engineering

A software engineer could have unmounted the storage while the software is active during test. This approach is faulty because it has a couple of issues. First, unmounting the storage does not produce exactly the same symptom. Unmounting the storage in most cases gives a clear failure upfront and the application would have caught it. What we need is a delay in storage long enough to cause a time out. Second, we’d have to perform this activity with an operating system command with sufficient privileges. The software being tested usually do not have such privileges. We need to systematically inject failures of particular kind.

Chaos are interruptions along with the cascading effects, that happen in production but are impossible or extremely difficult to emulate in lower environments through automated quality process. To improve robustness, we need the capability to emulate various failure scenarios in a systematic manner. Chaos Engineering aims to improve such capability.

Chaos Engineering emerged as a discipline to improve software’s ability to tolerate failures while still delivery adequate quality of service. This is known as the resiliency of the software. Suppose the storage has 99.9999% SLA, or 31 seconds of downtime every year. Chaos Engineer requires the functional parts of our software do what they can to protect the data, during the 31 seconds of turbulence each year, instead of just falling apart. In regulated industries, this is critical. Resilience testing is difficult in quality assurance process, but we can’t avoid it.

By definition, Chaos Engineering is the discipline of experimenting on a system in order to build confidence in the system’s capability to withstand turbulent conditions in production. It is particularly useful in distributed system, where network faults are normal. The one-page chaos engineering website has a good summary of such intent. At Netflix, they built Chaos Monkey, a tool to randomly cause failures on certain computing instances in the cloud. It is one of the first Chaos Engineering tools and it is a big step forward. Chaos Monkey can perform one type of experiment (faulty server) and requires writing custom code.

Chaos Mesh

Moving to Kubernetes platform, where everything operates on network, it is even more important to have a suite of resilience testing tools. Thankfully, we have Chaos Mesh, a cloud-native Chaos Engineering platform that helps platform engineers and software engineers simulate faults in a variety of scenarios. There are other chaos engineering tools (such as Litmus, also a CNCF project) but I will just focus on Chaos Mesh in this post because it has longer development history.

With Chaos Mesh, we can run experiments to simulate certain types of faults, including faults on Pod, Network, File I/O, DNS, Time, JVM, Linux Kernel, HTTP. We can also emulate incidents on cloud platforms (Azure, AWS, GCP) and emulate stress. We can even orchestrate multiple experiments into a workflow. Experiments can start ad hoc or on schedule. In addition to Kubernetes platform, the Chaos Mesh team also provides a tool Chaosd to emulate faults on a physical nodes. In the rest of this post, we will install Chaos Mesh and perform four simple experiments using the bookinfo sample application from Istio’s installer.

Demo Platform

In this lab, we install chaos mesh on Minikube on my Mac environment. I have install the platform in a particular way so the experiments will all be successful. I use this script in my real-quick-cluster project to create minikube cluster. This script configures a 3-node minikube cluster, with containerd as CRI, and enables plugins metallb and metrics server. Metallb provides a load balancer for the cluster. Metrics server allows scaling based on metrics, a test scenario for stressor in Chaos Mesh.

I will also install Istio in this lab, because I use it for Ingress and service routing. I also use a sample application called bookinfo which comes with Istio code repository. It is highly recommended to have an ingress as it is used in production, although you may use your own choice of ingress and service routing tool such as ingress-nginx. To install istio, we run this simple script:

#! /bin/bash
curl -L https://istio.io/downloadIstio | sh -
export PATH=$(realpath istio*/bin):$PATH
if istioctl x precheck; then
 echo ready to install istio and label namespace for istio-injection
 istioctl install -f istio-operator.yaml -y --verify
 kubectl label namespace default istio-injection=enabled
else
 echo failed precheck
 exit 1
fi

Below is the content of istio-operator.yaml

apiVersion: install.istio.io/v1alpha2
kind: IstioOperator
metadata:
 name: istio-operator
spec:
 profile: default
 hub: docker.io/istio
 tag: 1.13.2
 namespace: istio-system
 meshConfig:
 accessLogFile: /dev/stdout
 components:
 pilot:
 k8s:
 hpaSpec:
 maxReplicas: 7
 minReplicas: 1
 nodeSelector:
 beta.kubernetes.io/os: linux
 overlays:
 - kind: Deployment
 name: istiod
 patches:
 - path: spec.template.metadata.labels.version
 value: 1.13.2
 ingressGateways:
 - name: istio-ingressgateway
 enabled: true
 label:
 istio: ingressgateway
 k8s:
 hpaSpec:
 maxReplicas: 5
 minReplicas: 1
 service:
 ports:
 - name: http
 port: 80
 targetPort: 20080
 protocol: TCP
 - name: http-dashboard
 port: 8080
 targetPort: 28080
 protocol: TCP
 overlays:
 - kind: Deployment
 name: istio-ingressgateway
 patches:
 - path: spec.template.metadata.labels.version
 value: 1.13.2
 - path: spec.template.spec.containers[name:istio-proxy].lifecycle
 value:
 preStop:
 exec:
 command: ["sh", "-c", "sleep 5"]

For more about istio installation, refer to my previous post. Next, we’ll create the namespaces, install bookinfo and install chaos mesh using Helm:

kubectl create ns chaos-testing
kubectl create ns bookinfo

kubectl -n bookinfo apply -f istio/samples/bookinfo/platform/kube/bookinfo.yaml
kubectl -n bookinfo apply -f istio/samples/bookinfo/networking/bookinfo-gateway.yaml

helm install chaos-mesh chaos-mesh/chaos-mesh -n chaos-testing --version 2.2.0 --set dashboard.service.type=ClusterIP --set chaosDaemon.runtime=containerd --set chaosDaemon.socketPath=/run/containerd/containerd.sock

As soon as we install bookinfo, we should be able to access it at http://192.168.64.16/productpage, suppose the IP address is 192.168.64.16. We will simply use HTTP because certificate is not the point of this demo. Note that when we install Chaos Mesh we have to specify the runtime (containerd). Otherwise, we might run into issues when running experiments (e.g. “unable to flush ip sets” for network faults). Before fault injections, we’ll start a curl command and observe the output:

while true; do
 curl -I http://192.168.64.16/productpage --connect-timeout 4 --max-time 5
 sleep 5
done

We can watch the output of the command above as we inject each of the following faults later on.

Chaos Mesh UI

Since we installed chaos mesh as cluster IP service, we need to expose it using Istio Gateway and Virtual Service with the following manifest. If you have your own choice of Ingress, use a corresponding ingress resource.

apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1alpha3
kind: Gateway
metadata:
 name: chaos-dashboard-gateway
 namespace: chaos-testing
spec:
 selector:
 istio: ingressgateway
 servers:
 - port:
 number: 8080
 name: http
 protocol: HTTP
 hosts:
 - "*"
---
apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1alpha3
kind: VirtualService
metadata:
 name: chaos-dashboard-vs
 namespace: chaos-testing
spec:
 hosts:
 - "*"
 gateways:
 - chaos-dashboard-gateway
 http:
 - route:
 - destination:
 port:
 number: 2333
 host: chaos-dashboard

Once we configured Virtual Service and Gateways, and waited all Pods in chaos-testing namespace to come up, then we should be able to access the web portal of chaos mesh at 192.168.64.16:8080. Follow the on-screen instruction to fetch the token for access at Cluster level.

Chaos Mesh Web Portal

Now, we can create experiments, either using web portal, or using their CRDs. We will use CRDs in this demo.

Network Latency Injection

In this section we artificially introduce a network latency of 3 seconds for a period of 45 seconds. It takes effect as soon as we create the NetworkChaos CRD as below:

apiVersion: chaos-mesh.org/v1alpha1
kind: NetworkChaos
metadata:
 name: network-delay
spec:
 action: delay # the specific chaos action to inject
 mode: one # the mode to run chaos action; supported modes are one/all/fixed/fixed-percent/random-max-percent
 selector: # pods where to inject chaos actions
 namespaces:
 - bookinfo
 labelSelectors:
 app: productpage
 delay:
 latency: '3s'
 duration: '45s'

Watch for the curl output, which normally returns 200 code every 5 seconds, now fails for about 45 second window.

After the window of latency injection, the curl test returns normal. During the experiment, we can check the status of the fault injection by describing the NetworkChaos object. Alternatively, we can look at Experiments and Events in Chaos Mesh web portal. When completed, we can delete the NetworkChaos object. Alternatively, we can archive the experiment from web portal.

HTTP Failure Injection

The NetworkChaos API injects faults at Pod’s network layer. HTTPChaos API introduces HTTP error. We can configure an HTTPChaos object following the instruction:

apiVersion: chaos-mesh.org/v1alpha1
kind: HTTPChaos
metadata:
 name: test-http-chaos
spec:
 mode: all
 selector:
 namespaces:
 - bookinfo
 labelSelectors:
 app: productpage
 target: Request
 port: 9080
 #method: GET
 path: '*'
 abort: true
 duration: 2m

This object intercepts HTTP calls to the Pods as labelled and aborts the request. If we monitor the curl output at the same time, we can see that it starts to receive 503 error as soon as we injected the fault.

Once we remove the HTTPChaos object, the return code becomes 200 again.

Pod Failure Injection

We can emulate a fault that kills a Pod with the following manifest:

apiVersion: chaos-mesh.org/v1alpha1
kind: PodChaos
metadata:
 name: pod-failure-example
spec:
 action: pod-kill
 mode: one
 duration: '30s'
 selector:
 namespaces:
 - bookinfo
 labelSelectors:
 app: productpage

In the mean time, watch for the Pods in the bookinfo namespace, we’ll notice the old Pod being terminated.

Because the Pod is managed by a replica set, the replica set brings up a new Pod to ensure the desired number of replicas.

Stressor

In this experiment, we add an HPA (Horizontal Pod Autoscaler) to the productpage deployment, emulate a memory stress to the Pod and watch it scale up. Before the testing, we need to first configure a resource request for memory for the deployment. To configure memory request, edit the deployment productpage-v1 by adding memory request:

Then we add an HPA as below:

apiVersion: autoscaling/v2
kind: HorizontalPodAutoscaler
metadata:
 name: productpage-deploy
 namespace: bookinfo
spec:
 maxReplicas: 4
 minReplicas: 1
 scaleTargetRef:
 apiVersion: apps/v1
 kind: Deployment
 name: productpage-v1
 metrics:
 - type: Resource
 resource:
 name: memory
 target:
 type: Utilization
 averageUtilization: 70

Now if we describe the HPA, we shall see that HPA is active:

Then we create a StressChaos object as below:

apiVersion: chaos-mesh.org/v1alpha1
kind: StressChaos
metadata:
 name: memory-stress-example
spec:
 mode: one
 selector:
 namespaces:
 - bookinfo
 labelSelectors:
 app: productpage
 stressors:
 memory:
 workers: 2
 size: 128MiB

It will take some time for the HPA to detect the memory stress and scale up. We can tweak this with scaling policy. After scaling activity, the HPA status will report with the new desired number of replica:

We can also confirm that by checking the deployment size. If we want the size to reduce after we remove the stressor, we need to configure HPA accordingly with scale down triggers.

Chaos Mesh uses stress-ng utility to emulate memory or cpu stress on a Pod.

Summary

Chaos mesh is a cloud native resilience testing tool. It supports many fault experiments not only on Kubernetes, but also on virtual machines. I wish I came across this tool sooner in my professional life. Had I had chaosd in the past, I could have incorporate it in our quality assurance process on Linux platform. Without Chaos Mesh, we’d have to use different utilities for different types of faults (e.g. stress or stress-ng for cpu and memory stress). In the domain of platform engineering on Kubernetes, it helps not only software developers, but also platform engineers with correct configuration for workloads on Kubernetes. In this post we explored four types of faults. For more about all fault types and their attributes, go to their documentation for more details.

Knative Eventing Introduction

Fri, 29 Apr 2022 10:16:00 -0400

In the previous post, I mentioned that Knative Serving and Knative Eventing should be seen as two different projects. The former is supposed to be widely used as a serving layer for microservices, whereas the latter has a narrower customer base. There are a dozen companies who need to build Platform as a Service, and will benefit from event-driven architecture. They are the niche customer for Knative Eventing. In this post, we go through two demos for Eventing.

Event Driven Architecture

Before jumping into Knative eventing, let’s first understand the value of event-driven architecture. As covered in Knative presentation in 2020, a growing micro-service architecture involves lots of service-to-service communications that looks like a spider web in a diagram. Two services communicating with each other are tightly coupled: changing one requires a change of the other. Event-driven architecture evolves to decouple those interdependent services. Knative eventing tries to standardize the event data with Cloud Event and also proposes a framework to drive this architecture.

The documentation uses different words to express the same concepts. So let’s take a note first: source = producer which emits events, and sink = subscriber = consumer which is the destination of events. Knative Eventing supports two models of in even-driven architecture.

Brokers and Triggers provides an “event mesh”. Event producers delivers events to a Broker. Triggers then distribute them uniformly by consumers.

Broker is a “hub” for events. It is a central location to receive and send events for delivery. We can choose from the following broker types:

MT (multi-tenant) channel-based broker (which a channel implementation, such as Kaka channel or an in-memory channel)
GCP broker
Apache Kafka broker
RabbitMQ broker

Triggers represents a desire to subscribe to events from a specific broker. It can act as a filter

channel-subscriber model

Channels and Subscriptions provide a “event pipe” model which transforms and routes events between Channels using Subscriptions. This model makes more sense when events out of one system needs to be transformed and then routed to another process.

A channel can be either a generic channel object, or a custom channel implementation (such as Kafka channel or in-memory channel)

The subscription consists of a Subscription object, which specifies the Channel and the Sink (aka the Subscriber) to deliver events to. You can also specify some Sink-specific options, such as how to handle failures.

The key difference is Broker-Trigger model allows you to filter events, where as Channel-Subscription model allows you to transform events.

Note that a Knative Service can act as both a Source and a Sink for events, and for good reason. You may want to consume events from the Broker and send modified events back to the Broker, as you would in any pipeline use-case. Between these components, Knative Eventing uses CloudEvents to send information back and forth.

Knative Eventing Lab

We can create a lab cluster using Kind as per the instruction in real-quicK-cluster. In docker-desktop settings, I configured 6 CPU and 8GB memory as the lab involves a number of nodes. The creation takes a couple minutes. This Knative eventing lab has four paths one can take, based on different model and different implementations:

Lab A demonstrates the configuration of broker-trigger model using Kafka based broker.
Lab B demonstrates the configuration of channel-subscription model, using in-memory channel.

The two labs share some common steps. We first install Knative Eventing using the provided manifests:

$ kubectl apply -f https://github.com/knative/eventing/releases/download/knative-v1.3.0/eventing-crds.yaml
$ kubectl apply -f https://github.com/knative/eventing/releases/download/knative-v1.3.0/eventing-core.yaml
$ kubectl get pods -n knative-eventing

The Pods should come to READY fairly quickly. In the mean time, we can configure the consumer as well using the manifests below:

apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
 name: event-example
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
 name: hello-display
 namespace: event-example
spec:
 replicas: 1
 selector:
 matchLabels: &labels
 app: hello-display
 template:
 metadata:
 labels: *labels
 spec:
 containers:
 - name: event-display
 image: gcr.io/knative-releases/knative.dev/eventing/cmd/event_display
---
kind: Service
apiVersion: v1
metadata:
 name: hello-display
 namespace: event-example
spec:
 selector:
 app: hello-display
 ports:
 - protocol: TCP
 port: 80
 targetPort: 8080
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
 name: goodbye-display
 namespace: event-example
spec:
 replicas: 1
 selector:
 matchLabels: &labels
 app: goodbye-display
 template:
 metadata:
 labels: *labels
 spec:
 containers:
 - name: event-display
 image: gcr.io/knative-releases/knative.dev/eventing/cmd/event_display
---
kind: Service
apiVersion: v1
metadata:
 name: goodbye-display
 namespace: event-example
spec:
 selector:
 app: goodbye-display
 ports:
 - protocol: TCP
 port: 80
 targetPort: 8080

The consumers (aka sinks) will be able to process events at the validation step at the end.

Lab A – Install Kafka and configure Kafka-based Broker

This lab is for broker-trigger model. We first configure a Kafka Broker, which requires a Kafka cluster. The document uses Strimzi operator to quickly install Kafka cluster. Instead, here we use Helm to install the Kafka cluster:

helm install my-cluster-kafka bitnami/kafka -n kafka --create-namespace --set volumePermissions.enabled=true --set replicaCount=3

At the end of installation, the Helm notes indicate that the bootstrap server is my-cluster-kafka.kafka.svc.cluster.local:9092. All Kafka pods should come ready in about 5 minutes. After cluster install, we need to install Kafka controller and the Broker-layer data plane which allow you to map a Kafka instance to Broker CRD later:

kubectl apply -f https://github.com/knative-sandbox/eventing-kafka-broker/releases/download/knative-v1.3.0/eventing-kafka-controller.yaml
kubectl apply -f https://github.com/knative-sandbox/eventing-kafka-broker/releases/download/knative-v1.3.0/eventing-kafka-broker.yaml
kubectl get pods -n knative-eventing
kubectl -n knative-eventing edit cm kafka-broker-config

As the command above suggests, once data plane is installed, we edit the default broker config by updating the bootstrap.servers with the bootstrap server address noted above. We also need to make sure the replication factor is no greater than number of partitions, which should not be a problem in our lab as the replica count was set to 3.

Now we can create a Broker in the same namespace with consumer:

apiVersion: eventing.knative.dev/v1
kind: Broker
metadata:
 name: default
 namespace: event-example
 annotations:
 eventing.knative.dev/broker.class: Kafka
spec:
 config:
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: ConfigMap
 name: kafka-broker-config
 namespace: knative-eventing

Once the manifest above is applied, we should see the status of broker (named default) to be READY. We can also validate broker creation with kn CLI command:

 $ kubectl -n event-example get broker default
NAME URL AGE READY REASON
default http://kafka-broker-ingress.knative-eventing.svc.cluster.local/event-example/default 19m True
$ kn broker list -n event-example
NAME URL AGE CONDITIONS READY REASON
default http://kafka-broker-ingress.knative-eventing.svc.cluster.local/event-example/default 19m 7 OK / 7 True

Then we create Triggers that connects both to the broker with filters, and to the consumers by referencing service name. The manifest to create triggers is provided below:

apiVersion: eventing.knative.dev/v1
kind: Trigger
metadata:
 name: hello-display
 namespace: event-example
spec:
 broker: default
 filter:
 attributes:
 type: greeting
 subscriber:
 ref:
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: Service
 name: hello-display
---
apiVersion: eventing.knative.dev/v1
kind: Trigger
metadata:
 name: goodbye-display
 namespace: event-example
spec:
 broker: default
 filter:
 attributes:
 source: sendoff
 subscriber:
 ref:
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: Service
 name: goodbye-display

We can confirm the setups above by monitoring the resources (like we did for broker), or use knative CLI:

$ kn trigger list -n event-example
NAME BROKER SINK AGE CONDITIONS READY REASON
goodbye-display default service:goodbye-display 3m24s 6 OK / 6 True
hello-display default service:hello-display 3m24s 6 OK / 6 True

Now we can go to the validation step to send event and validate result.

Lab B – Install in-memory channel and configure Channel

This lab is for channel-subscription model. we first install an in-memory channel:

kubectl apply -f https://github.com/knative/eventing/releases/download/knative-v1.3.0/in-memory-channel.yaml

Then we can map this channel to a Channel resource in Eventing. We can do so by applying the manifest below:

apiVersion: messaging.knative.dev/v1
kind: Channel
metadata:
 name: demo-channel-1
 namespace: event-example
---
apiVersion: messaging.knative.dev/v1
kind: Channel
metadata:
 name: demo-channel-2
 namespace: event-example

The creation of Channel resources can be verified as below

$ kn -n event-example channel list
NAME TYPE URL AGE READY REASON
demo-channel-1 InMemoryChannel http://demo-channel-1-kn-channel.event-example.svc.cluster.local 6m34s True
demo-channel-2 InMemoryChannel http://demo-channel-2-kn-channel.event-example.svc.cluster.local 6m34s True

Now we need to create Subscription which connects Channels to Consumers. Subscriptions can be created with the manifest below:

apiVersion: messaging.knative.dev/v1
kind: Subscription
metadata:
 name: demo-subscription-1
 namespace: event-example
spec:
 channel:
 apiVersion: messaging.knative.dev/v1
 kind: Channel
 name: demo-channel-1
 subscriber:
 ref:
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: Service
 name: hello-display
---
apiVersion: messaging.knative.dev/v1
kind: Subscription
metadata:
 name: demo-subscription-2
 namespace: event-example
spec:
 channel:
 apiVersion: messaging.knative.dev/v1
 kind: Channel
 name: demo-channel-2
 subscriber:
 ref:
 apiVersion: v1
 kind: Service
 name: goodbye-display

We can confirm subscription:

$ kn -n event-example subscription list
NAME CHANNEL SUBSCRIBER REPLY DEAD LETTER SINK READY REASON
demo-subscription-1 Channel:demo-channel-1 service:hello-display True
demo-subscription-2 Channel:demo-channel-2 service:goodbye-display True

Now we can go to validation step.

Validation

For validation, we need to first configure an event source. The source in our lab is a throw-away Pod with curl utility. I use my favourite nicolaka netshoot to fire off the events using. To launch the Pod and get to command shell:

$ kubectl run tmp-shell -n event-example --rm -i --tty --image nicolaka/netshoot -- /bin/bash
If you don't see a command prompt, try pressing enter.
bash-5.1#

We can POST message to the corresponding endpoint URL to fire events. The endpoint is different for each lab:

Lab	URL
A (Kafka-based broker)	http://kafka-broker-ingress.knative-eventing.svc.cluster.local/event-example/default
B (channel)	http://demo-channel-1-kn-channel.event-example.svc.cluster.local http://demo-channel-2-kn-channel.event-example.svc.cluster.local

With the correct URL, we can build a payload for POST method. Below is three curl commands with different payload POST to the same endpoint (taking lab A as an example):

# curl -v "http://broker-ingress.knative-eventing.svc.cluster.local/event-example/default" \
-X POST \
-H "Ce-Id: say-hello" \
-H "Ce-Specversion: 1.0" \
-H "Ce-Type: greeting" \
-H "Ce-Source: not-sendoff" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"msg":"Hello Knative!"}'

# curl -v "http://broker-ingress.knative-eventing.svc.cluster.local/event-example/default" \
-X POST \
-H "Ce-Id: say-goodbye" \
-H "Ce-Specversion: 1.0" \
-H "Ce-Type: not-greeting" \
-H "Ce-Source: sendoff" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"msg":"Goodbye Knative!"}'

# curl -v "http://broker-ingress.knative-eventing.svc.cluster.local/event-example/default" \
-X POST \
-H "Ce-Id: say-hello-goodbye" \
-H "Ce-Specversion: 1.0" \
-H "Ce-Type: greeting" \
-H "Ce-Source: sendoff" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"msg":"Hello Knative! Goodbye Knative!"}'

All the requests should receive 202 return code. As highlighted above, we specified type and source for each event fired to the broker. On the consumer side, we can simply check the pod log to verify the events received. Below is an example of events received as a result of the events sent above (take broker-trigger model as example):

$ kubectl -n event-example logs -l app=hello-display --tail=100
2022/03/09 17:05:59 Failed to read tracing config, using the no-op default: empty json tracing config
☁️ cloudevents.Event
Context Attributes,
 specversion: 1.0
 type: greeting
 source: not-sendoff
 id: say-hello
 datacontenttype: application/json
Extensions,
 knativearrivaltime: 2022-03-09T17:14:19.196589801Z
Data,
 {
 "msg": "Hello Knative!"
 }
☁️ cloudevents.Event
Context Attributes,
 specversion: 1.0
 type: greeting
 source: sendoff
 id: say-hello-goodbye
 datacontenttype: application/json
Extensions,
 knativearrivaltime: 2022-03-09T17:14:42.977803608Z
Data,
 {
 "msg": "Hello Knative! Goodbye Knative!"
 }
$ kubectl -n event-example logs -l app=goodbye-display --tail=100
2022/03/09 17:05:58 Failed to read tracing config, using the no-op default: empty json tracing config
☁️ cloudevents.Event
Context Attributes,
 specversion: 1.0
 type: not-greeting
 source: sendoff
 id: say-goodbye
 datacontenttype: application/json
Extensions,
 knativearrivaltime: 2022-03-09T17:14:27.430702588Z
Data,
 {
 "msg": "Goodbye Knative!"
 }
☁️ cloudevents.Event
Context Attributes,
 specversion: 1.0
 type: greeting
 source: sendoff
 id: say-hello-goodbye
 datacontenttype: application/json
Extensions,
 knativearrivaltime: 2022-03-09T17:14:42.977803608Z
Data,
 {
 "msg": "Hello Knative! Goodbye Knative!"
 }

This is the gist of Knative evening. Note that the format of HTTP payload when we fire off events needs to conform to CloudEvents format. The container image (event_display) used in the container is also created for the purpose of processing events received and display them in stdout.

Conclusion

Persistent storage allows for stateful applications on Kubernetes. It also enables architectural patterns that requires persistent storage. Knative eventing is a framework that enables event driven architecture. It supports many messaging channels (including NATs, a cloud-native messaging system) and broker types (MT channel based, GCP, RabbitMQ).

Istio Operation Gotchas

Sat, 19 Mar 2022 11:09:00 -0400

In this post I discuss a few aspects when putting istio in operation.

Installation

Istio installation can be confusing, due to architectural and guideline changes as well as renaming of operator CRDs since its release, and especially since 2020. This left lots of information outdated on the web, adding to Istio’s perceived complexity.

Currently, the recommended installation methods are istioctl or Helm. Using Istio Operator manifest (with out istioctl) is discouraged. As to the Helm chart installer, it was once deprecated (around early 2020), but was later re-introduced in the fall of 2021. This back-and-forth had caused some aversion. As of Nov 2021, their re-introduced Helm charts version dropped alpha tag. The Helm repo consists of separate Helm charts, for Istio CRD (base), control plane (istiod), each gateway and CNI respectively. A typical deployment therefore requires multiple Helm Releases (example here). Istio document still considers Helm support as alpha, so I assume the most reliable method to install Istio is istioctl.

The istioctl utility can be used with many options to customize Istio install. For example, we can supply a YAML declaration input (to -f switch) to customize installation behaviours. The YAML file declares a CRD. Two different CRDs have been used: IstioOperator and IstioControlPlane. According to this blog and this post, since Istio 1.5 in early 2020, we’re supposed to IstioOperator CRD exclusively. The IstioControlPlane CRD is left only for legacy support. As stated in the current documentation:

The istioctl command supports the full IstioOperator API via command-line options for individual settings or for passing a yaml file containing an IstioOperator custom resource (CR).

With IstioOperator CRD, we still have a number of options to tweak the install behaviours. Here is a summary of potential options:

use IstioOperator API via IstioOperator CRD (without using “values” or overlay fields)
specify an attribute value in argument, including a pre-built profile e.g. –set meshConfig.accessLogFile=/dev/stdout, –set profile=demo
use K8sObjectOverlay by using “k8s/overlays/patches” field in IstioOperatorCRD
use Helm API by using “values” field in IstioOperatorCRD

The key-value specified in –set switch overrides the same key-value supplied in the IstioOperator CRD. So option 2 overrides option 1. The value for profile can also be empty if you’d rather start from scratch. However too many –set switches makes the command wordy so we should build our own IstioOperator CRD

For option 4, the document hyper-links Helm API to a section from version istio 1.4, and I appears to exist only for legacy (pre-2020 Helm support) compatibility. Option 3 (K8sObjectOverlay) would be helpful when a field cannot be conveniently customized with option 1 and we have to patch the object like in Kustomization.

So the most practical approach is IstioOperator CRD for per-component customization, potentially with K8sObjectOverlay. No matter which option, istioctl compiles the installation manifest before applying it against Kubernetes API. This manifest can be previewed using “istioctl manifest” command, so that you can take a look before installation.

Thank you Isito for so much confusion just to land on a working installation method. Below is the content of az-istio-operator.yaml file that I use for my installation:

apiVersion: install.istio.io/v1alpha1
kind: IstioOperator
metadata:
 name: istio-install-customization
spec:
 profile: default
 hub: docker.io/istio
 tag: 1.13.1
 revision: 1-13-1
 namespace: istio-system
 meshConfig:
 accessLogFile: /dev/stdout
 outboundTrafficPolicy:
 mode: "REGISTRY_ONLY"
 components:
 pilot:
 k8s:
 hpaSpec:
 maxReplicas: 7
 minReplicas: 1
 nodeSelector:
 beta.kubernetes.io/os: linux
 ingressGateways:
 - name: istio-ingressgateway
 #namespace: istio-ingress
 enabled: true
 label:
 istio: ingressgateway
 k8s:
 hpaSpec:
 maxReplicas: 11
 minReplicas: 1
 serviceAnnotations:
 service.beta.kubernetes.io/azure-load-balancer-internal: "true"
 service.beta.kubernetes.io/azure-load-balancer-internal-subnet: "my-lb-subnet"
 egressGateways:
 - name: istio-egressgateway
 enabled: true

I can preview the install, run the install and validate installation status:

$ istioctl manifest generate -f az-istio-operator.yaml
$ istioctl install -f az-istio-operator.yaml -y --verify
$ istioctl verify-install -f az-istio-operator.yaml
$ kubectl -n istio-system get IstioOperator installed-state-istio-install-customization-1-13-1 -o yaml | less

Note that in the IstioOperator declaration I marked the revision. This is helpful when I run multiple versions of control plane (e.g. during upgrade). I can check revisions of istiod with:

$ istioctl x revision list

We can delete installed istio components

$ istioctl x uninstall -f az-istio-operator.yaml
$ istioctl x uninstall --revision 1-11-5

In practice, it is helpful to use separate operators each for a different component (pilot, ingressGateways, egressGateways). This makes maintenance and upgrade easier.

Debugging

The documentation has a page for common problems that one needs to be familiar with. It covers not only problems, but also steps to troubleshoot each kind of problem (e.g. authorization policy).

Although istioctl is pretty confusing as an installation tool, it is a good utility for many troubleshooting activities. We should probably add its path to PATH environment variable and add the export command (e.g. export PATH=”$HOME/istio/bin:$PATH“) to .zshrc or .bashrc. Istioctl has a few useful subcommands, some of which are only available as experimental and therefore needs to be following an x. Some common commands are given below:

To analyze Istio problems:

$ istioctl analyze -n istio-system

To look at proxy configuration of an Envoy instance at different levels, use proxy-config sub-command or pc for shorthand:

$ istioctl proxy-config <clusters|listeners|routes|endpoints|bootstrap|log|secret|stats>
$ istioctl pc cluster deploy/istio-ingressgateway -n istio-system # see what Envoy cluster an ingress gateway knows about
$ istioctl proxy-config log deploy/httpbin --level "rbac:debug"
$ istioctl pc log <pod_name> -n <namespace> --level connection:debug
$ istioctl pc secret -n istio-system deploy/istio-ingressgateway # check certificates loaded to a gateway
$ istioctl proxy-config listeners deploy/istio-ingressgateway -n istio-system # query envoy listener configuration
$ istioctl pc routes deploy/istio-ingressgateway -n istio-system --name http.8080 # query envoy route configuration

The last two commands set logging level to the specified workload. If we want to set logging level at mesh level, we can use these commands:

$ istioctl admin log --level authorization:debug
$ istioctl admin log

To look at synchronization status of each envoy in the mesh, use proxy-status sub-command, or ps for shorthand:

$ istioctl ps # ensure data plane is in sync

If an item for a workload shows STALE instead of SYNCED, it means that the configuration has not been pushed from control plane to that instance of Envoy proxy. Check if the Istio configuration change is valid. If the system is newly installed and there is no ingress or egress gateway resources declared, the RDS column for ingress or egress may show “NOT SENT”. The far right column displays the version of istiod connected.

To describe applied istio config:

$ istioctl describe <pod|service>
$ istioctl describe po workload1 -n my-workload # detect misconfigurations on workload

To view dashboard:

$ istioctl dashboard <envoy|grafana|prometheus>

To check authorization policy on a Pod,

$ istioctl x authz check mypod -n workload

To validate istio configuration in a file:

$ istioctl validate -f resource_authorization_policy.yaml

Sometimes we need to turn on access logging just on the envoy proxy on the Gateway Pod. In that case, we will need to apply Istio’s Envoy filter object. This filter is applied to Pods labelled as gateway. It patches the existing filter chain with the additional defined in the manifest:

apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1alpha3
kind: EnvoyFilter
metadata:
 name: hcm-gw-access-log
 namespace: istio-system
spec:
 workloadSelector:
 labels:
 istio: ingressgateway
 configPatches:
 - applyTo: NETWORK_FILTER
 match:
 context: GATEWAY
 listener:
 filterChain:
 sni: demo.digihunch.com
 filter:
 name: "envoy.filters.network.http_connection_manager"
 patch:
 operation: MERGE
 value:
 typed_config:
 "@type": "type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.network.http_connection_manager.v3.HttpConnectionManager"
 access_log:
 - name: envoy.access_loggers.file
 typed_config:
 "@type": "type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.access_loggers.file.v3.FileAccessLog"
 path: /dev/stdout
 format: "[%START_TIME%] \"%REQ(:METHOD)% %REQ(X-ENVOY-ORIGINAL-PATH?:PATH)% %PROTOCOL%\" %RESPONSE_CODE% %RESPONSE_FLAGS% \"%UPSTREAM_TRANSPORT_FAILURE_REASON%\" %BYTES_RECEIVED% %BYTES_SENT% %DURATION% %RESP(X-ENVOY-UPSTREAM-SERVICE-TIME)% \"%REQ(X-FORWARDED-FOR)%\" \"%REQ(USER-AGENT)%\" \"%REQ(X-REQUEST-ID)%\" \"%REQ(:AUTHORITY)%\" \"%UPSTREAM_HOST%\" %UPSTREAM_CLUSTER% %UPSTREAM_LOCAL_ADDRESS% %DOWNSTREAM_LOCAL_ADDRESS% %DOWNSTREAM_REMOTE_ADDRESS% %REQUESTED_SERVER_NAME% %ROUTE_NAME%\n"

The object above enables access logging on the Gateway Pods only, without impacting other Envoy proxies.

Multi-tenancy

In large enterprises, Istio is usually installed by a platform/operation team. The entire platform is shared by multiple application teams. Istio should not be seen as a responsibility of a single party. It is necessary to break down the Istio CRDs and define the responsibility of each CRD. For example:

Gateways are placed in the istio-system namespace (or a dedicated istio-ingress namespace in some case). Platform team can decide whether a Gateway is considered a shared infrastructure, or each tenant (application team) uses their own Gateway. In the servers/hosts field of Gateway declaration, add namespace before host to suggest that the routing behaviour of that host must be defined in a certain namespace.
Virtual Services can be managed in two models as well. They can be managed individually and are all placed in each tenant namespace. Alternatively in a shared responsibility model, Virtual Service can be created in istio-system namespace, and the processing of each match can be delegated to a Virtual Service in each tenant namespace, using the Delegate feature of Virtual Service. Another field that can help with multi-tenancy is the “gateways” field, you can specify a value of mesh to indicate the virtual service is available to the entire mesh.
Destination Rules are usually placed in each Tenant’s workspace
Peer Authentication also depends on the configuration. If a mesh level configuration is enforced, it is easier for the Platform Team to manage it and this should be the setup for new clusters. If for historical reasons Peer Authentication is enforced per tenant namespace, it can be delegated to each application team. It can make communication troubleshooting more complex.
Control Plane and observability workloads such as Kiali are usually the responsibility of Platform team.
Request Authentication and Authorization Policy should be the responsibility of individual application team.

In a multi-tenancy management model, Istio related resource should be subject to admission control policy, as well as scrutiny by the security and platform teams. Google Anthos has a good page on the constraint templates for Istio resources.

As to restricting traffic between namespaces, apart from the measures from this previous post, we can also use Sidecar CRD to restrict outbound traffic. As its documentation states:

Sidecar describes the configuration of the sidecar proxy that mediates inbound and outbound communication to the workload instance it is attached to. By default, Istio will program all sidecar proxies in the mesh with the necessary configuration required to reach every workload instance in the mesh, as well as accept traffic on all the ports associated with the workload. The Sidecar configuration provides a way to fine tune the set of ports, protocols that the proxy will accept when forwarding traffic to and from the workload. In addition, it is possible to restrict the set of services that the proxy can reach when forwarding outbound traffic from workload instances.

The documentation page also includes two examples. The first is a sidecar at the mesh level that restricts outbound traffic to the same namespace that the sidecar is in, and the istio-system namespace:

apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: Sidecar
metadata:
 name: default
 namespace: istio-config
spec:
 egress:
 - hosts:
 - "./*"
 - "istio-system/*"

The second example overrides the mesh level default above, and allows egress traffic to three specified namespaces:

apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: Sidecar
metadata:
 name: default
 namespace: prod-us1
spec:
 egress:
 - hosts:
 - "prod-us1/*"
 - "prod-apis/*"
 - "istio-system/*"

As to inbound control, we can expose a Virtual Service to other namespaces by using the exportTo field to specify which other namespaces the Virtual Service should be exported to. If no namespaces are specified then the virtual service is exported to all namespaces by default.

Sometimes we want a virtual services to expose to both outside of the mesh via Ingress, and within the mesh, and we hope to use the same hostname. For this requirement, we can use the ServiceEntry CRD. ServiceEntry enables adding additional entries into Istio’s internal service registry.

Service Proxy – from Nginx to Envoy

Wed, 09 Mar 2022 21:36:00 -0400

Update (Nov 20, 2022): 1. Envoy’s configuration schema can be hard to get used to. It is lacking examples because the documentation is mostly generated. Use its examples directory to find real-life configuration examples. 2. the Envoy implementation in the example project has been reverted in favour of Nginx.

Envoy proxy is the underlying technology for Istio, as well as a number of other service mesh products, such as AppMesh (AWS), Consul (Hashicorp) and OpenServiceMesh (Azure). Most of the capabilities of Isito is ultimately provided by Envoy proxy. Envoy has a page outlining its differences with similar technologies. I decided to take a look into Envoy by replacing Nginx with it.

Rate limiting and Circuit Breaker

In most SDLC, it is application developers that create backend APIs or server applications. Most developers specializes in application features, and cannot fathom all the nuances with the TCP/IP network stack. Nginx allows them to push network concerns (non-business features) to a dedicated proxy to handle the dynamics in network connection. Nginx can be configured as both a reverse proxy (handling incoming connection on behalf of the process) and a forward proxy (handling outgoing connection on behalf of the process). This is the prototype of sidecar pattern, an important idea behind service mesh. For example, when a sudden increase in connection to the server-side application, the server process could be either unresponsive (refer to “the queuing knee“, and Little’s Law), or OOM killed. When such interruptions are not automatically recovered, a downtime is caused. This traditionally requires some congestion control strategy for TCP/IP queue but two features provided by a network proxy can help circumvent this situation: rate limiting, and circuit breaking. Rate limiting keeps more requests above threshold from entering the queue. Circuit breaker releases downstream pressure by cutting out existing in-queue request. Nginx added both over the years but Circuit breaker still remains a premium feature exclusive to Nginx Plus. Envoy on the other hand has them free when it was launched.

Envoy also supports other advanced traffic management such as traffic shaping, and mirroring. It is on top of those features that Istio introduces its own abstraction such as virtual service, destination rules to its users. In that sense, we can think of Istio as a configurator (control plane) for Envoy proxy (data plane), similar to Ansible to Nginx proxy instances.

Dynamic Configuration via API

I used Nginx previously with traditional environment and loved its flexibility. As the system grows, I started to feel the pain of management overhead. With one of the production system, there were 25 + instances of Nginx each running on a VM and I managed configuration files with Ansible. Ansible pushes out configuration files and triggers a reload from each Nginx instance. In the cloud-native era where Pods are ephemeral, this kind of overhead would snowball to an unmanageable level. Envoy was designed for cloud-native applications, with all these kinds of problems in mind. Envoy has dynamic configuration. The majority of the configurations can be pulled from xDS API, or file system. Updating configuration drains connections gracefully without runtime having to reload the file. The idea of centrally managing Nginx instances with Ansible, also evolved into the concept of control plane.

TLS origination

In the Orthweb project, I used Nginx to proxy TLS and HTTP traffic, and performed TLS termination on both ports. This is know as TLS offloading. The traffic between the proxy and the upstream service takes place in the clear, even though they do not travel across different network interfaces in most cases. For a true end-to-end encryption, it is helpful to also encrypt the traffic between proxy and upstream server. This requires the capability of securing TCP traffic to upstream server. With Nginx, the ability to secure HTTP traffic to upstream server is offered in open-source. The ability to secure TCP traffic is available in Nginx Plus, or with self-compiled binary. In Envoy, both are available using the UpstreamTlsContext configuration.

More pros

In another post, I also discussed Nginx as a LDAP proxy to front services such as Kibana and Nifi. It requires a proxy service (ldap-auth in this case), to defer auth to third party. Envoy has this capability using a filter with extension for external authorization. Istio also exposes this capability, an enabler for the configuration proposed in my previous post. Envoy also uses WebAssembly for its extensibility.

Another useful feature is protocol detection. It can use filters to detect protocol (TLS or regular TCP) and route traffic to predefined destination.

Performance wise, this benchmark from 2018 ran a comparison among the popular options where Envoy leads by a margin.

Observability (logging, metrics and tracing) are well supported in Envoy. User can configure format of logs that takes effect immediately. There are many metrics that works with Prometheus and they are expandable using filters. On the tracing side, Envoy supports integration with jaeger, zipkin and datadog.

Basics of Envoy

The configuration of Envoy is more involving. There is an Envoy course by Tetrate, as well as two blog entries for envoy 101: Envoy as gateway proxy and File-based dynamic configuration. Another good way to get started is the Sandboxes projects, which covers a number of different areas of configuration. The admin port (by default at port 9901. Istio’s default is 15000) provides helpful information. If we need to turn on debug on some features, we can do so with curl:

curl -X POST http://localhost:9901/logging?client=debug

Stats are exposed at the same port:

curl -X GET http://localhost:9901/stats

When packets are received at a listener, the is first processed by listener filters. Then, depending on filter match, one or more network filter chains will further process the packet, including further actions, as illustrated below:

Envoy supports dynamic configuration, which uses a set of discovery services (xDS) APIs. Some of the important xDS APIs include:

LDS (Listener Discovery Service) – allows you to add listeners dynamically while Envoy is running
RDS (Route Discovery Service) – allows you to dynamically update routes for HTTP connection managers
CDS (Cluster Discovery Service) – allows you to update cluster definitions dynamically
EDS (Endpoint Discovery Service) – allows you to add or remove endpoints dynamically
Secret DS

The relation can be illustrated in this diagram below:

This post from Tetrate has more examples.

Nginx to Envoy

For the advantages of Envoy, I decided to migrate from Nginx to Envoy on my Orthweb project. Using Envoy as service proxy is not where Envoy is mostly used (as sidecar), but it is how Envoy was originally used at Lyft to replace ELB in 2015.

The original Nginx configuration was referenced in this old blog post. The Envoy setup also covers both TCP (DICOM) and HTTP (HTTPS) traffic. For HTTP traffic, it also encrypts the traffic to upstream. Below is what it looks like:

admin:
 address:
 socket_address: { address: 0.0.0.0, port_value: 9901 }
static_resources:
 listeners:
 - name: https_listener
 address:
 socket_address:
 address: 0.0.0.0
 port_value: 443
 filter_chains:
 - filters:
 - name: envoy.filters.network.http_connection_manager
 typed_config:
 "@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.network.http_connection_manager.v3.HttpConnectionManager
 codec_type: AUTO
 stat_prefix: ingress_http
 route_config:
 name: local_route
 virtual_hosts:
 - name: app
 domains:
 - "*"
 routes:
 - match:
 prefix: "/"
 route:
 cluster: service-https
 http_filters:
 - name: envoy.filters.http.router
 transport_socket:
 name: envoy.transport_sockets.tls
 typed_config:
 "@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v3.DownstreamTlsContext
 common_tls_context:
 tls_certificates:
 - certificate_chain: {"filename": "/etc/ssl/certs/site.pem"}
 private_key: {"filename": "/etc/ssl/certs/site.pem"}
 - name: dicomtls_listener
 address:
 socket_address:
 address: 0.0.0.0
 port_value: 11112
 filter_chains:
 - filters:
 - name: envoy.filters.network.tcp_proxy
 typed_config:
 "@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.network.tcp_proxy.v3.TcpProxy
 stat_prefix: downstream_cx_total
 cluster: service-dicomtls
 transport_socket:
 name: envoy.transport_sockets.tls
 typed_config:
 "@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v3.DownstreamTlsContext
 common_tls_context:
 tls_certificates:
 - certificate_chain: {"filename": "/etc/ssl/certs/site.pem"}
 private_key: {"filename": "/etc/ssl/certs/site.pem"}
 validation_context:
 allow_expired_certificate: true
 trusted_ca: {"filename": "/etc/ssl/certs/site.pem"}
 require_client_certificate: false
 clusters:
 - name: service-https
 type: STRICT_DNS
 lb_policy: ROUND_ROBIN
 load_assignment:
 cluster_name: service-https
 endpoints:
 - lb_endpoints:
 - endpoint:
 address:
 socket_address:
 address: orthanc-backend
 port_value: 8042
 transport_socket:
 name: envoy.transport_sockets.tls
 typed_config:
 "@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.transport_sockets.tls.v3.UpstreamTlsContext
 - name: service-dicomtls
 type: STRICT_DNS
 lb_policy: ROUND_ROBIN
 load_assignment:
 cluster_name: service-dicomtls
 endpoints:
 - lb_endpoints:
 - endpoint:
 address:
 socket_address:
 address: orthanc-backend
 port_value: 4242
layered_runtime:
 layers:
 - name: static_layer_0
 static_layer:
 envoy:
 resource_limits:
 listener:
 https_listener:
 connection_limit: 1000
 overload:
 global_downstream_max_connections: 5000

From Nginx to Envoy, to achieve nearly the same functionalities, it takes 100 lines of configuration instead of less than 30. The configuration also appears more abstract, which is one of the cons of Envoy to consider before the migration.

Update from Jan 2025 – To align with what most uses in Orthanc community, the project switched back to using Nginx. The envoy configuration is kept here.

Istio External Authorization via OIDC

Fri, 25 Feb 2022 01:29:00 -0400

Istio service mesh allows application developers to offload non-core features to infrastructure layer. We explored authentication and authorization with Istio in a basic lab. In this post we continue to explore its capabilities with OIDC integration. This capability is made available thanks to the CUSTOM action in authorization policy, supported since the release of 1.9. It enables any workload on Istio to integrate with an external IAM solution.

The rest of this post, provides the step-by-step instruction to configure OIDC integration, based on Istio’s External Authorization use case. My work is influenced by two blog posts from jetstack and elastisys on similar topic, with my own additions, simplifications and clarifications. In this lab I use my own DNS hostname demo1.digihunch.com and to follow along you need to bring your own hostname as well. The prerequisites of this lab is summarized as below:

An identity provider: we use Google in the lab but it can be anything with OIDC capabilities (e.g. Azure AD, Facebook). Read my old post for more details on OIDC.
A public IP address for Cluster’s Ingress service: Since we use Google as identity provider on the Internet, we need our service to be exposed on the Internet because the OIDC integration involves a two-way HTTP redirect.
Public DNS resolution to the service’s public IP: during authentication, the identity provider will call back with JWT. So we need our hostname demo1.digihunch.com resolved to the service’s public IP address. This is also required in other scenarios. For example, cert-manager needs to automatically configure X.509 certificate using Let’s Encrypt.
An application workload: this is the tenant workload without its own IAM capability. We use a dummy workload base on a hello-world image, for simplicity.

The files required in this lab is in istio-oidc repo under the envoy directory. It is also important to understand the Authentication Code flow in OIDC authorization code flow to make sense of the integration between OIDC provider and Istio on our platform. For example, the client application needs a one-time registration with identity provider. Let’s start with this configuration.

Configure Identity Provider

We need a Google account with a GCP project and log on to APIs & Services to register our application. At the console, from the left side bar, click on “OAuth consent screen” and create an App. Provide the followings:

Step 1. OAuth consent screen. Under App Information, provide App name and User support email.
Step 1. OAuth consent screen. Under App domain, provide Application home page
Step 1. OAuth consent screen. Under Authorized domains, provide an Authorized domain.
Step 3. Test users. Add the emails for Test users.

The summary page looks like this:

OAuth Consent Screen

Then on the sidebar, click on Credentials. We create new credentials for OAuth 2.0 Client ID. Select Web application and add “https://demo1.digihunch.com/oauth2/callback” as an Authorized redirect URI. The credential created includes a Client ID and a Client secret, which can be downloaded as a JSON file. Here is my screen:

API Credential

Note that the redirect URIs cannot be localhost. Because the browser will consume the redirect URI and it has no clue where localhost is. It must resolve to the public IP of the ingress.

We need to keep the Client ID and Client secret for later use. According to Google’s documentation, there is a discovery document from which we can understand the keys in their Open ID configuration. We need the value of two keys (issuer and jwks_url) to use later in the configuration.

Configure Infrastructure Services

My real-quicK-cluster project has a few different ways to quickly bring up a cluster. For this lab, I use Azure CLI command to create a simple, three-node cluster:

$ az aks create \
 -g AutomationTest \
 -n orthCluster \
 --node-count 3 \
 --enable-addons monitoring \
 --generate-ssh-keys \
 --vm-set-type VirtualMachineScaleSets \
 --network-plugin azure \
 --network-policy calico \
 --tags Owner=MyOwner

Then we configure kubeconfig credential to connect to the cluster, so that kubectl and helm CLI commands to connect to the newly created cluster.

$ az aks get-credentials --resource-group AutomationTest --name orthCluster

Then we will install the infrastructure services and workload. We can start with loading environment variables for use later:

OIDC_DISCOVERY=$(curl "https://accounts.google.com/.well-known/openid-configuration")
OIDC_ISSUER_URL=$(echo $OIDC_DISCOVERY | jq -r .issuer)
OIDC_JWKS_URI=$(echo $OIDC_DISCOVERY | jq -r .jwks_uri) 
COOKIE_SECRET=$(openssl rand -base64 32 | tr -- '+/' '-_')
WEB_HOST="demo1.digihunch.com"
CLIENT_ID="ThisIsTheClientIDFromGoogle"
CLIENT_SECRET="ThisIsTheClientSecretFromGoogle"

For WEB_HOST, CLIENT_ID, CLIENT_SECRET, you need to bring your own values. The COOKIE_SECRET value is randomly generated. The variables OIDC_ISSUER_URL and OIDC_JWKS_URI are parsed from Google OpenID configuration and they should remain static. We can validate the value with echo commands. Also, to use helm v3 later, we need to add the repositories we need. These steps can be skipped if they have been performed in the client environment:

$ echo $OIDC_ISSUER_URL
https://accounts.google.com
$ echo $OIDC_JWKS_URI
https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v3/certs
$ helm repo add jetstack https://charts.jetstack.io
$ helm repo add istio https://istio-release.storage.googleapis.com/charts
$ helm repo add oauth2-proxy https://oauth2-proxy.github.io/manifests
$ helm repo update

Now, with Helm ready, we can install Cert Manager, Istio CRD, Control Plane, Gateways as well as OAuth2-Proxy using Helm. We run each of the following commands from the envoy directory, where the required files are stored:

$ helm install cert-manager jetstack/cert-manager \
 --namespace cert-manager \
 --create-namespace \
 --version v1.7.1 \
 --set installCRDs=true
$ helm install -n istio-system istio-base istio/base --create-namespace
$ helm -n istio-system install istiod istio/istiod -f istiod-values.yaml --wait
$ helm -n istio-system install istio-ingress istio/gateway -f ingress-gateway-values.yaml
$ kubectl -n istio-system get po
$ kubectl create ns oauth2-proxy && kubectl label ns oauth2-proxy istio-injection=enabled
$ helm install -n oauth2-proxy \
 --version 6.0.1 \
 --values oauth2-proxy-values.yaml \
 --set config.clientID=$CLIENT_ID \
 --set config.clientSecret=$CLIENT_SECRET \
 --set config.cookieSecret=$COOKIE_SECRET \
 --set extraArgs.oidc-issuer-url=$OIDC_ISSUER_URL \
 --set extraArgs.whitelist-domain=$WEB_HOST \
 oauth2-proxy oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy
$ kubectl -n oauth2-proxy get pods -l app=oauth2-proxy

Note that the istiod installation step uses a value file that includes extensionProviders. This is where we tell Istio to connect to external authorization provider:

meshConfig:
 accessLogFile: /dev/stdout
 extensionProviders:
 - name: oauth2-proxy
 envoyExtAuthzHttp:
 service: oauth2-proxy.oauth2-proxy.svc.cluster.local
 port: 4180
 includeRequestHeadersInCheck:
 - cookie
 headersToUpstreamOnAllow:
 - authorization
 headersToDownstreamOnDeny:
 - set-cookie

When we install istio ingress gateway, we need to expose port 80 as well as 443. Port 80 is used in ACME protocol for certificate configuration. We also installed oauth2-proxy with some configurations from oauth2-proxy-values.yaml as well as some argument set imperatively.

Once configuration is successful, we should be able to confirm that oauth2-proxy service is running. We should also be able to tell the External IP address of the Ingress:

$ kubectl -n oauth2-proxy get svc
$ kubectl -n istio-system get service istio-ingressgateway -o jsonpath='{.status.loadBalancer.ingress[0].ip}'

Now we can go to our DNS configuration portal, to populate the DNS A-record for demo1.digihunch.com with this IP address:

Add DNS A-record

It may take several minutes to a couple of hours, for the A-record update/creation to take effect, depending on the TTL. Sit tight and query DNS with nslookup command, until it is set. In the next step, we will need successful DNS resolution for certificate configuration.

Install workload and configure Certificate

Now we install the workload, along with the necessary constructs such as Gateway CRD, Virtual Service, and certificates. We can use kubectl kustomize command to preview the changes, then apply the changes with -k:

$ kubectl kustomize demo
$ kubectl apply -k demo

When you have your own DNS hostname, modify the kustomization.yaml accordingly before applying. This command uses Kustomization to apply numerous YAML manifests in the demo directory, including the following activities:

Create a Namespace named demo
Create Deployment and Service
Set up PeerAuthentication for the mesh
Configure Ingress class, ClusterIssuer and Certificate using cert-manager
Configure Virtual Service and Gateway

This configures everything we need and we need to verify from several aspects. The demo Service is a ClusterIP service exposed within the cluster at port 80. Then we check the status of certificate:

$ kubectl -n istio-system get certificate
$ kubectl -n istio-system describe certificate demo

The column of READY should have a value of True. Check the logs from cert manager Pods if that’s not the case. Common reasons include:

The automatic ACME validation is just not ready
The automatic ACME validation is still waiting for DNS resolution
The Istio ingress gateway port 80 is not open for ACME validation
The let’s encrypt server applies rate limiting

Note that for the ACME server, we can use staging server’s URL or productions. The former provisions a certificate that may come off as insecure as the CA is not fully trusted by browser. The latter doesn’t have this issue, but the server applies rate limiting. For more details of how validation with ACME work, check out my previous post.

Once the certificate is applied, our website is open to any visitor with HTTPS access:

Then we will use Request Authentication and Authorization Policy to tighten up the access by requiring visiting user to log in with Google identity.

RequestAuthentication and AuthorizationPolicy

We configure a CUSTOM action in the AuthorizationPolicy, and specified the provider by name oauth2-proxy. The YAML manifests for RequestAuthentication and AuthorizationPolicy looks like this:

apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: RequestAuthentication
metadata:
 name: istio-ingressgateway
 namespace: istio-system
spec:
 jwtRules:
 - issuer: https://accounts.google.com
 jwksUri: https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v3/certs
 selector:
 matchLabels:
 app: istio-ingressgateway
---
apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: AuthorizationPolicy
metadata:
 name: istio-ingressgateway
 namespace: istio-system
spec:
 action: CUSTOM
 provider:
 name: oauth2-proxy
 rules:
 - {}
 selector:
 matchLabels:
 app: istio-ingressgateway

Note that we cannot apply Request Authentication and Authorization Policy before we confirm that the Certificate has been created. This is because when letsencrypt use HTTP resolver to provision certificate with ACME protocol, the request from letsencrypt should get to the validating URI without being asked to provide a Google identity. So do not perform this step yet before confirming the previous step:

$ kubectl apply -f oidc-auth.yaml

Now launch your browser in incognito mode and browse to our URL (https://demo1.digihunch.com) and you will be re-redirected to log on to Google (accounts.google.com). Once logged on, you will have access to the site.

If you run into errors, check the oauth2-proxy log from Pod stdout, which should give a reason of 4xx errors. If oauth2-proxy log indicates no activity, confirm if the request has been forwarded to the proxy. Check the service object of the proxy and make sure it is exposed to the correct port, as indicated in the meshConfig. To check mesh config, examine the configmap named istio in the namespace of istio-system. To check if Istio’s authorization is unable to speak with oatuh2-proxy, inspect the log of istiod Pod.

To clean up the lab, remove the app registration from Google, and then delete the cluster from Azure:

$ az aks delete -g AutomationTest -n orthCluster

In this lab we used a very open AuthorizationPolicy. We can polish it up with more conditions such as:

apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: AuthorizationPolicy
metadata:
 name: istio-ingressgateway
 namespace: istio-system
spec:
 action: CUSTOM
 provider:
 name: oauth2-proxy
 rules:
 - when:
 - key: request.auth.audiences
 values:
 - $CLIENT_ID
 selector:
 matchLabels:
 app: istio-ingressgateway

Under the rules section, we can explore the claims from the JWT and make creative use of it to achieve our specific goals for IAM.

Bottom line

In this lab, we registered our app with Google and obtained client ID and secret for it to identify our application. We configured oauth2-proxy as our IAM application, carrying the credential validated by Google. We also configured Istio to delegate authorization to oauth2-proxy as external authorization provide, making up an entire OIDC integration.

The third party service (IdP) we integrate with is GCP, which natively supports OIDC protocol. However, if the third party IdP does not support OIDC natively, such as Active Directory via LDAP, then we would need one more proxy to sit between OAuth2 and the external IdP service. One good choice is the Dex connector. Another more complex yet powerful alternative connector is Key Cloak. Consider Dex or KeyCloak as an OIDC proxy, when:

The external IdP does not support OIDC; or
We choose not to use the OIDC capability of the external IdP because we want to managed OIDC centrally in our own proxy
The external identity provider does support OIDC, but the configuration is managed by a different team (e.g. IAM team) other than the platform team

AuthorizationPolicy is the key piece in this integration, and it is executed at the http filter in envoy sidecar proxy. It can be done with alternatives to OAuth2-Proxy such as the authservice project. A slightly different approach to implement OIDC integration is to use leverage extensibility of WebAssembly (a sandboxing technology to extend Envoy), which is suggested in this example for WasmPlugin. However, Wasm is still considered experimental.

Istio Lab – Authentication and Authorization

Sun, 13 Feb 2022 13:21:13 -0400

My previous blog discussed as service mesh what Istio can offer in terms of authentication and authorization capabilities. Istio can authenticate an incoming HTTP request, ensuring the JWT issued has not been tampered somewhere in the middle. The fields in the JWT allows for more flexibilities at the point of authorization. This combination allows Istio to integrate with identity providers that can issue JWT.

We’ve also discussed how JWT works, and pointed out that the two key element of request authentication is the JWT (payload signed with private key) itself as well as the JWK (carrying public key). In this post, we will test it in a lab. To start with this lab, we need a test cluster (e.g. Minikube) with Istio installed.

Preparation

I have not find a native Bash way to produce JWT. We will do that with python packages python_jwt and jwcrypto in Python3. Let’s install the modules and import them in Python environment.

$ python3 -m pip install python_jwt jwcrypto datetime
$ python3
>>> import python_jwt as jwt, jwcrypto.jwk as jwk, datetime

Now we’re in the Python3 shell with needed modules loaded. We can take the following steps to produce the JWT as well as the JWK:

RSAkey = jwk.JWK.generate(kty='RSA', size=2048)
private_key = RSAkey.export_private()
public_key = RSAkey.export_public()
raw_payload = {'iss':'digihunch.com','sub':'DIGIHUNCH','role':'reader','permission':'read'}

## use private key to generate jwt token. HTTP request will bear this token 
jwt_token = jwt.generate_jwt(raw_payload, jwk.JWK.from_json(private_key), 'RS256', datetime.timedelta(minutes=50))
print(jwt_token)

## The JWKS keeps public key and is referenced by Istio RequestAuthentication object
jwks='{"keys":['+public_key+']}'
print(jwks)

# Helpful command to print the key in PEM format:
## RSAkey.export_to_pem(private_key=False)
# Helpful command to verify JWT token:
## header, claims = jwt.verify_jwt(jwt_token, jwk.JWK.from_json(public_key), ['RS256'])

To complete this lab, we need the values of jwt_token and jwks.

Next in the preparation is a local cluster, istio with metallb installed, which is covered in a previous post. We should be able to get the ingress IP address:

$ export INGRESS_HOST=$(kubectl -n istio-system get service istio-ingressgateway -o jsonpath='{.status.loadBalancer.ingress[0].ip}')
$ echo $INGRESS_HOST

We create our own namespace and use the httpbin application:

$ kubectl create ns web 
$ kubectl label namespace web istio-injection=enabled
$ kubectl apply -n web -f httpbin.yaml
$ kubectl apply -n web -f httpbin-gateway.yaml
$ curl -I -XGET $INGRESS_HOST/headers

The curl command above (without any token) should return HTTP 200 code, indicating that no authorization token is needed to connect to the service. Note that the Pod for httpbin has the label app=httpbin which will be used in the request authentication. Also note that traffic is served over a named port called http in the Service object for http, which will implicitly enable HTTP based conditions for authorization policies we will build later.

Request Authentication

Let’s create a request authentication object with the following manifest:

apiVersion: "security.istio.io/v1beta1"
kind: "RequestAuthentication"
metadata:
 name: jwt-req-authn
 namespace: web
spec:
 selector:
 matchLabels:
 app: httpbin
 jwtRules:
 - issuer: "digihunch.com"
 jwks: |
 ## jwks output from previous step ##

Replace the last line with the jwks output from the preparation step and store it to jwt-req-authn.yaml. It should look like this:

jwt-req-authn.yaml

Then apply it to the web namespace:

$ kubectl -n web apply -f jwt-req-authn.yaml

Now the request authentication resource is applied to the httpbin workload. We first test it with a random authentication token and it should be denied of 401 error:

$ curl -I -XGET $INGRESS_HOST/headers --header "Authorization: Bearer randomstring"
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
www-authenticate: Bearer realm="http://192.168.64.16/headers", error="invalid_token"
content-length: 79
content-type: text/plain
date: Sun, 13 Feb 2022 16:13:32 GMT
server: istio-envoy
x-envoy-upstream-service-time: 31

Then we take the jwt_token from the preparation step and present it to the request authentication resource by sending an HTTP request with the appropriate authorization token. It should return an HTTP 200 code this time:

$ curl -I -XGET $INGRESS_HOST/headers --header "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJleHAiOjE2NDQ3NzE0NjUsImlhdCI6MTY0NDc2ODQ2NSwiaXNzIjoiZGlnaWh1bmNoLmNvbSIsImp0aSI6Im1faUhla2pNbWRmUmlsWEdCaTFBR3ciLCJuYmYiOjE2NDQ3Njg0NjUsInBlcm1pc3Npb24iOiJyZWFkIiwicm9sZSI6InJlYWRlciIsInN1YiI6IkRJR0lIVU5DSCJ9.sVppwmvDqKvSsVdB05a_mDHymZq7Okvnwu-caTywXQgsUvOA6HfaySp_WXMyTp1HQ4WcTqKE4frZm7QNtrZsPso4bdD_4mEDYTswTCWhblaPy236NJBEH3ilB2BVySBVQKsjyxd94F1KV24SFWiR6lUxk52wKKE3ipBwR79jPizhAu9xxrfJ2Lfi5ypNa_kjBdJi63KCt2Y0eW94Fjq3PZs4ZalHJyaXYSx5Gxyei5f7QdpEOBpvs13mSdi9RqkgVQOjE0V1uBRpMckMyZs-IijknJcSu4fkrjgfNmXsrm__-vlM9UjUl2Jlj0x8bRC8l20IZ6t1ml-GFkwj39JC0g"

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
server: istio-envoy
date: Sun, 13 Feb 2022 16:13:54 GMT
content-type: application/json
content-length: 589
access-control-allow-origin: *
access-control-allow-credentials: true
x-envoy-upstream-service-time: 17

In the example above, jwtRules can be used with other keys such as jwksUri to reference the jwks by Uri. More fields in JWTRules can be found here.

Now we have tested three curl commands:

Without authentication token at all: http server (istio-envoy) returns 200 code.
With an invalid authentication token: http server (istio-envoy) returns 401 code for error.
with a valid authentication: http server (istio-envoy) returns 200 code.

So we have the capability to validate token, but it is not yet mandatory to present the token. We can change this behaviour by tweaking authorization policy.

Authorization Policy

According to Istio documentation, to restrict access to authenticated requests only, this should be accompanied by an authorization rule. We start with the following policy:

apiVersion: "security.istio.io/v1beta1"
kind: "AuthorizationPolicy"
metadata:
 name: auth-pol
 namespace: web
spec:
 selector:
 matchLabels:
 app: httpbin
 action: ALLOW
 rules:
 - from:
 - source:
 requestPrincipals: ["*"]

Applying the manifest above to namespace web to it applies to workload httpbin. Then we

$ curl -I -XGET $INGRESS_HOST/headers
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
content-length: 19
content-type: text/plain
date: Sun, 13 Feb 2022 16:29:58 GMT
server: istio-envoy
x-envoy-upstream-service-time: 35

The requestPrincipals clause makes it mandatory to present a token. The RequestAuthentication validates the token.

We can beef up the authorization policies by adding claims to the conditions, for example:

apiVersion: "security.istio.io/v1beta1"
kind: "AuthorizationPolicy"
metadata:
 name: auth-pol
 namespace: web
spec:
 selector:
 matchLabels:
 app: httpbin
 action: ALLOW
 rules:
 - from:
 - source:
 requestPrincipals: ["*"]
 to:
 - operation:
 methods: ["GET"]
 when:
 - key: request.auth.claims[iss]
 values: ["digihunch.com"]
 - key: request.auth.claims[role]
 values: ["reader"]

Both the to and when conditions are for HTTP traffic only, and we must tell Istio to inspect the traffic as HTTP, which is done implicitly with named ports on the Service object. Refer to this common problem from Istio’s documentation. The request principals, if a none wildcard value is specified, will be a SPIFFE format identity, the same one used for peer authentication, as discussed in the previous post.

The when clause above contains two key-value pairs. The first looks for the value of a standard claim (iss), the second for a custom claim (role). In the preparation step, we created the claims with those claims in Python and they will match the condition here.

Should any of the conditions above not match, a 403 (Forbidden) error code will be returned by the workload’s istio-envoy proxy.

Verify mTLS connection

In some cases, we need to audit whether the TLS traffic between workloads actually take place in mTLS. As I was developing my korthweb project, I don’t find a straightforward way of validating TLS. We can validate that mTLS mode on a workload using the following istio CTL command:

$ istioctl x describe pod my-workload-pod -n [namespace]

The output shows Effective PeerAuthentication and Applied PeerAuthentication. This verifies configuration. But how can we ensure that traffic are indeed using mTLS? For most of mTLS traffic, we can use Kiali’s observability feature. In Graph, we need to ensure “Security” is checked in the display drop-down. The pad lock will indicate the traffic is mTLS. To get reliable results, we have to artificially create some live traffic between workloads (e.g. curl from one Pod to another) so Kiali can pick up the update.

Validate mTLS traffic in Kiali

Unfortunately, even artificial traffic does not make Kiali the most reliable way to detect mTLS. There are three other approach to verify TLS traffic.

The first approach is to let Envoy proxy emit TLS related traffic. We can apply the following annotation line to a Pod, to tell its Envoy proxy to emit measurements related to tls_inspector:

sidecar.istio.io/statsInclusionPrefixes: "tls_inspector,listener.0.0.0.0_15006"

The metrics will be exposed to Envoy’s admin port (15000 on istio-proxy) with the path /stats. For example:

$ kubectl -n orthweb exec orthanc-7f4c9b759-lxnrb -c istio-proxy -- curl localhost:15000/stats | grep tls_inspector
 % Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current
 Dload Upload Total Spent Left Speed
100 22194 0 22194 0 0 21.1M 0 --:--:-- --:--:-- --:--:-- 21.1M
tls_inspector.alpn_found: 13
tls_inspector.alpn_not_found: 0
tls_inspector.client_hello_too_large: 0
tls_inspector.connection_closed: 0
tls_inspector.read_error: 0
tls_inspector.sni_found: 13
tls_inspector.sni_not_found: 0
tls_inspector.tls_found: 13
tls_inspector.tls_not_found: 0

We still need some live traffic to bump up the measurement. Comparing between tls_found and tls_not_found is a good way to determine if a Pod is receiving both TLS and plaintext traffic in PERMISSIVE mode.

The second approach to tell mTLS is via the connection_security_policy metric label. It is set to mtutual_tls if the connection is in mTLS. We need the dashboard for Prometheus:

$ istioctl dashboard prometheus

In the prometheus dashboard, click on “Graph” at the top, then search for “istio_tcp_connections_closed_total” for “istio_tcp_connections_opened_total“, the result should include a metrics called connection_security_policy which is labelled as mtutual_tls, as illustrated below:

mTLS metric

For more about collecting and querying metrics from Prometheus, check out Istio’s documentation here and here.

The third approach is to utilize the AUDIT feature of Authorization Policy. When a rule in Authorization Policy has a source with namespace or notNamespace field, it requires the incoming connection to have an SPIFFE identity and use mTLS. We can set the Authorization Policy’s action to AUDIT and use RBAC access logging, the same way we would do to troubleshoot RBAC access issues. From the log we can check RBAC failures due to missing SPIFFE identity.

Istio Authentication and Authorization

Sat, 05 Feb 2022 23:04:00 -0400

Applications running on Kubernetes platform seeks to offload common non-business features to the platform. Istio helps Kubernetes bridge that gap. It can enforce mTLS communication, which is known as Peer Authentication. It can help with two other things with the use of JWT token: when a web request presents a JWT token, it can validate whether it is authentic. Then, it can use the claims in JWT token to drive authorization decision on whether the specific request is allowed or denied. Both will use Istio CRDs.

Peer Authentication

Istio can enforce mTLS for TCP traffic between Pods. According to its documentation, enforcing mTLS at mesh level is as simple as applying a Peer Authentication resource to the root-level namespace:

apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: PeerAuthentication
metadata:
 name: default
 namespace: istio-system
spec:
 mtls:
 mode: STRICT

The role of mTLS is so Pods can validates each other’s identity and then encrypt the TLS traffic in between. Each workload must first have an identity and Envoy proxy addressed this issue by adopting SPIFFE framework. It gives each workload an identity in the format of <TRUST_DOMAIN>/ns/<NAMESPACE>/sa/<SERVICE_ACCOUNT>. For example: spiffe://cluster.local/ns/myapp-dev/sa/default. It is also important to understand that only Pods with injected Envoy sidecar have SPIFFE workload identity and therefore is able to speak in mTLS. For new services, this is usually not an issue. For migrating workload without sidecar, a Pod without sidecar may connect with one in the mesh (with sidecar) if the mtls mode is PERMISSIVE in Peer Authentication. Otherwise, the connect is reset at layer 4 with the following error:

curl: (56) Recv failure: Connection reset by peer
command terminated with exit code 56

Therefore, it is advisable to start with PERMISSIVE mode for a precautionary migration of workload to mTLS. With mTLS all effective at the mesh level, there is no need to natively configure TLS between services.

The SPIFFE identity used in PeerAuthentication can also be used in Request Authorization as rule conditions. I will discuss request authentication before request authorization. To understand request authentication, let’s first warm up on JWT.

JSON Web Token

JSON Web Token (JWT, RFC 7519) is a format to carry JSON payload with optional signature and/or encryption. It can be thought of as a document (in JSON format) with signature for web servers to exchange information. The signature portion makes it friendly for document consumers to validate the authenticity. It is also URL-safe, and thereby adopted in web-browser SSO context, to pass identity of an authenticated user between and identity provider and a service provider.

JWT enables token-based authentication, a significant improvement from traditional session-based authentication. The traditional session-based authentication can be illustrated as below:

session-based authentication

This authentication model has major drawbacks. First, a mechanism to validate the authenticity of Cookie is missing. Second, the server has to keep the session information, making itself not stateless, unless a state store such as memcached is introduced.

token-based authentication

In token-based authentication such as using JWT, a token is issued. The authenticity of the token are validated before the server provides data, and it can be validated by any backend server.

The payload of JWT consists of claims, which are statements about an identity (such as name, role, email). There are custom claims as well as standard reserved claims, such as iss (issuer), sub (subject), aud (audience), iat (issued at time), exp (expiration time), and jti (JWT ID). When a program produces a JWT, it turns the raw payload into standardize payload by adding the required reserved claims and may sort the claims alphabetically.

The JWT consists of three parts with a period as delimiter:

The third part is a signature in the format of JWS (JSON Web Signature, RFC 7515) for the JWT consumer to validate its authenticity. The first and second parts, as you can tell, are the claims in the document. Their base64 encoding can be decoded with no effort and should therefore be considered exposed. Although JWT addresses the authenticity of information, it does not intend to address the confidentiality of the payload at HTTP layer. The payload should not carry sensitive information and should always be used with secure HTTPS port. To tackle this issue, there is JWE (JSON Web Encryption, RFC 7516) which is an implementation similar to JWT which also encrypts the payload.

Some IAM protocols are built on top of JWT. For example, the OpenID Connect specification also defines a set of standard claims that it uses while still allow custom claims.

Request Authentication

Istio can perform request authentication using its CRD. It is important to distinguish request authentication and user authentication. In user authentication, the identify provider typically looks up an identity store and compares password hash results to check whether the identity of the visiting user is authentic or not. This is outside of Istio’s capability but many off-the-shelf solution excels at it, such as Azure AD. Once the user’s identity is validated by identity provider, and a JWT is issued for downstream service providers to consume. Istio’s CRD can front the service provider and validate that the presented JWT is authentic. It authenticates the identity of a request (as truly issued by the trusted issuer without being tampered). This process does not involve checking user’s identity, even though user’s identity could be stored in the payload by the JWT issuer.

Istio uses the RequestAuthentication CRD to perform this function. The JWT issuer signs with its private key and stores the signature in the JWT. When it is presented to Istio, Istio’s RequestAuthentication CRD needs the public key of the issuer in order to validate the JWT. The public key usually comes in as a JWK (JSON Web Key, RFC7517), a format convertible to and from PEM format. The JWK can be provided either inline in the RequestAuthentication’s YAML manifest, or via a URI.

Below is an example of a basic RequestAuthentication declaration:

apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: RequestAuthentication
metadata:
 name: httpbin
 namespace: foo
spec:
 selector:
 matchLabels:
 app: httpbin
 jwtRules:
 - issuer: "issuer-foo"
 jwksUri: https://example.com/.well-known/jwks.json

In this example (from the documentation), the jwtRule requires that the issuer be issuer-foo, and the JWK (containing public key) is provided by a given URI address. Istio will pass the authentication once the signature in the presented JWT is verified with the JWK.

Authorization Policy

Istio’s Authorization Policy by itself can operate at both TCP or HTTP layers and is enforced at the envoy proxy. The result is an ALLOW or DENY decision, based on a set of conditions at both levels. If the traffic is HTTP then you should consider use some HTTP level information as it provides a lot more flexibility. Even when operating at HTTP layer, AuthorizationPolicy does not have to work in conjunction with RequestAuthentication. The rules can use path, methods, etc to drive an authorization decision, for example:

apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1
kind: AuthorizationPolicy
metadata:
 name: authz-policy-orthanc
spec:
 selector:
 matchLabels:
 app: orth
 action: ALLOW
 rules:
 - from:
 - source:
 namespaces: ["istio-system","orthweb"]
 to:
 - operation:
 methods: ["GET","POST","PUT","HEAD","DELETE"]
 ports: ["8042"]
 - from:
 - source:
 namespaces: ["istio-system","orthweb"]
 to:
 - operation:
 ports: ["4242"]

The claims in the JWT payload can also be used to drive authorization decision, as exemplified in the Istio documentation, by using a when keyword in a rule and specifying the claim as a key:

 when:
 - key: request.auth.claims[iss]
 values: ["https://accounts.google.com"]

The when clause requires that the iss claim in the JWT must carry a specific value in order to ALLOW the HTTP request. While the claims in JWT is just an additional factor to drive authorization decision, using authenticated information to drive authorization decision makes the overall workflow more secure, and should therefore be used when applicable.

When using AuthorizationPolicy CRD, keep in mind:

Use correct selectors so it only applies to workloads labelled as such. Without selector the policy takes effect in the entire namespace which is a recipe for issues
When multiple policies (each with multiple rules) are applied to the same workload, be aware of the policy precedence. Troubleshooting may get tricky.
For an AuthorizationPolicy to use HTTP fields in rules, it first needs to identify the traffic as HTTP. To tell Authorization Policy to treat the traffic as HTTP, we need to understand Protocol Selection. In a nutshell, we can name the port as http or http-* in the Service manifest of the workload. Otherwise all HTTP-based rules will be missed.

For troubleshooting, we can check authorization policies effective on a Pod with:

$ istioctl x authz check orthanc-6c9679d8c7-2ttlf -n dev-orthweb

This returns the effective policies but does not necessarily indicate which rule is matched when a request is denied or allowed. To find out further information, you will need to follow Istio FAQ to set RBAC logging to debug, and then monitor the log in the istio-proxy sidecar.

Apart from HTTP fields, path, authenticated claims in JWT, Istio Authorization can also integrate with an Open Policy Agent (OPA) to drive actions, in advanced use cases.

Bottom line

While Istio itself does not perform user authentication, its support of JWT in RequestAuthentication allows a workload to integrate with external identity provider. This capability, along with creative use of claims in JWT, also empowers authorization capability.

FluxCD: Continuous Deployment with GitOps

Sat, 15 Jan 2022 18:49:00 -0400

This post explains why I land on FluxCD GitOps for my project. Let’s star

Background

In the Korthweb project, I landed on Istio for the Ingress Gateway technology. I first attempted to expand the orthanc Helm Chart to bring Istio as dependency (sub-chart). One of the external chart for Istio gateway needs to be referenced multiple times (for ingress and egress). However, it cannot even be used as dependency (sub-chart) because of this issue. Istio didn’t re-introduce Helm Chart as a supported deployment until September 2021. So I’m not too confident about it.

This leads to a second thought of the “Big Helm Chart” approach to deploy all tiers in Korthweb. Helm is based on templating, and having two layers of charts brings complexity. I do need to bring a number of Helm charts together, but not necessarily by another Helm Chart.

The Kubernetes documentation also mentions Kustomize as an alternative to Helm. Below is a quick exploration of it.

Kustomize

A challenge with managing declarative object is to organize numerous manifest files to maintain consistency and readability. Kustomize is a standalone tool to customize Kubernetes objects through a Kustomization file. This page provides a good list of fields that can be used:

vars and replacements: copy fields from one source into any number of specified targets.
namePrefix, namespace, nameSuffix: customize namespace and names.
configMapGenerator, secretGenerator, and generatorOptions: create configuration entries from literal, files, or environment variables.
resources: indicates another kustomization directory (e.g. as base)
patches (also called overlays) add or override fields on resources.
patchesStrategicMerge: modifies values in known (loaded) resources
images: modifies the name, tags and/or digest for images, without creating patches.
openapi: use Kubernetes OpenAPI data to get merge key and patch strategy information about resource types.

The base -> overlay pattern ensures readability as well as portability. Typical use pattern is create one base kustomization, and several overlay kustomizations each representing an environment, such as dev, qa and production. Here is a good tutorial.

Helm and Kustomize are two approaches to deploy Kubernetes workload. Both tackle the challenge of managing many YAML declarations. Helm is template driven, and is commonly used by application developers as a means of packaging application releases while orchestrating the dependencies. Kustomize follows a base-overlay pattern, and is more commonly used by cluster operators for re-using manifests across multiple environments (e.g. dev, staging and prod).

In my use case, my deployment needs both. I need third party Helm chart to configure components such as PostgreSQL for HA. I also need Kustomize for the orthanc workload. With the need for both, there should be a higher level deployment technology that ingrate with both mechanisms.

GitOps

GitOps is originally brought up by Weaveworks in 2017. It is a methodology to deploy workload continuously, using a Git repository as source of truth. The point of GitOps is not about tooling, or specific platform, but rather to ensure the workload state matches the declaration in repository. For example, you can implement GitOps with Ansible for VM environment.

When it comes to managing Kubernetes workload, a GitOps tool must handle the challenge with managing many YAML declarations. Therefore most GitOps tools seek to support many well-adopted mechanisms such as Helm and Kustomize as discussed above, instead of simply taking an enormous amount of raw YAML declarations. The amount of deployment mechanisms supported, is a key indicator of how powerful a GitOps tool is.

The most notable tools are ArgoCD and FluxCD. Both are currently CNCF incubating projects. ArgoCD is powerful with many tools supported, such as Kustomize, Helm, Ksonnet, Jsonnet, etc. It also contains a user interface and aims to manage an entire deployment workflow. On the other hand, FluxCD has controllers mainly for Kustomize and Helm, with a jsonnet extension from third party. This post draws a comparison of them (along with JenkinsX) based on earlier versions (from mid 2020). There is even a standard (OpenGitOps) in CNCF landscape but still at Sandbox level.

For Korthweb project, I chose FluxCD. It is simple, and provides just enough types of controller for what I do.

FluxCD

The diagram below illustrates the components:

The configurations starts with a bootstrapping process, which creates directory in Git repository (if not exist), and installs flux-system components in the target Kubernetes cluster. The sync process starts as soon as bootstrapping is completed. The process in charge of syncing declarations to target cluster, confusingly, is also called Kustomization. Therefore there are two Kustomizations. According to the FAQ on FluxCD website:

There are two Kustomization types. the kustomization.kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io is a Kubernetes custom resource while kustomization.kustomize.config.k8s.io is the type used to configure a Kustomize overlay. The kustomization.kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io object refers to a kustomization.yaml file path inside a Git repository or Bucket source.

Inside of the Git repository, with a kustomization.kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io obejct, the flux-system points to Kustomization file (representing kustomization.kustomize.config.k8s.io object) at root level. The kustomization.yaml file organizes resources in the same directory. A kustomize directory may also reference other kustomize directory, forming a hierarchy.

Implementation

FluxCD has a command “flux check –pre” to check the prerequisite, such as kubectl. The code is stored in the GitOps directory of Korthweb repository.

To configure deployment, we need to first create a personal access token. For GitHub, here is the instruction. Export the token to environment variable, and launch bootstrapping:

$ export GITHUB_TOKEN=xxx_yyy55555XXXodr7ABBBB234CCccw
$ flux bootstrap github \
 --owner=digihunch \
 --repository=korthweb \
 --branch=main \
 --personal \
 --path=gitops/environment/dev

A deploy key is configured during the bootstrapping process. As soon as bootstrapping is completed, the sync (aka kustomization, or reconciliation) has started, which can be monitored using:

flux get kustomizations --watch

Running this command without –watch switch returns the overview of all kustomizations. Once reconciliation is completed, it should display something like:

NAME 	READY	MESSAGE 	REVISION 	SUSPENDED
application 	True 	Applied revision: main/98f3c771d4ab23f5cb5fd8c7aee325f6490000c7	main/98f3c771d4ab23f5cb5fd8c7aee325f6490000c7	False
dependency 	True 	Applied revision: main/98f3c771d4ab23f5cb5fd8c7aee325f6490000c7	main/98f3c771d4ab23f5cb5fd8c7aee325f6490000c7	False
flux-system 	True 	Applied revision: main/98f3c771d4ab23f5cb5fd8c7aee325f6490000c7	main/98f3c771d4ab23f5cb5fd8c7aee325f6490000c7	False
infrastructure	True 	Applied revision: main/98f3c771d4ab23f5cb5fd8c7aee325f6490000c7	main/98f3c771d4ab23f5cb5fd8c7aee325f6490000c7	False

FluxCD introduced a number of CRDS. For example, to check configured source repository, check gitrepositories CRD:

kubectl get gitrepositories -n flux-system

To check the detail of one kustomization (e.g. infrastructure), check kusomization CRD in flux-system namespace:

kubectl -n flux-system get kustomizations flux-system -o yaml | less

Other commonly used custom resources include:

helmcharts
helmreleases
helmrepositories

A Helm release can be created imperatively, for example:

$ flux create source helm istio \
 --interval=1h \
 --url=https://istio-release.storage.googleapis.com/charts
$ flux create helmrelease istio-base \
 --interval=1h \
 --release-name=istio-base \
 --target-namespace=istio-system \
 --create-target-namespace=true \
 --source=HelmRepository/istio \
 --chart=base \
 --chart-version="1.12.0" 


$ flux create helmrelease istiod \
 --interval=1h \
 --release-name=istiod \
 --target-namespace=istio-system \
 --source=HelmRepository/istio \
 --chart=istiod \
 --chart-version="1.12.0" \
 --values=istiod-values.yaml

However, in a GitOps approach, they should be stored as code (use –export to export declaration). For example, the infrastructure kustomization keeps HelmReleases for installing Istio and PostgreSQL. This kustomization is referenced by a Flux Kustomization from higher level.

You can also manually reconcile one of the kustomizations (or other CRDs) with flux reconcile command, for example:

flux reconcile kustomization dependency

Since Nov 2021, FluxCD (0.20) supports reconciliation based on server-side apply. This increases performance and help address issues such as applying large config map, which is the equivalent of adding –server-side flag to the kubectl apply command.

Limitation

Troubleshooting the FluxCD repo can be involving and counter-intuitive. I had to commit a lot of changes to the repo because it serves as source of truth. Even though the commits can be made to a branch, it still involves a lot of code pushes. Traditionally I commit a change after testing. In the GitOps workflow, I commit a change then to test.

More flexible troubleshooting options are still to be desired. For example, there is no way to run one (FluxCD’s) Kustomization object at a time (and disable the rest), unless you remove their YAML files from the repo.

The next limitation is the ordering of resources in Kustomization. Arguably this is a limitation from Kustomize, instead of FluxCD’s. For example, I need the following manifest to be executed:

apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
kind: ClusterIssuer
metadata:
 name: selfsigned-issuer
spec:
 selfSigned: {}

The resource is a CRD that needs to be first installed using Helm chart (cert-manager). However there’s no way to control the sequence (Helm release executed first before declaration using CRD). Although there’s some workaround, it is not convenient. Alternatively, we can separate the resource creation and CRD creation into separate kustomization objects with dependency relationship, as suggested in this example.

Summary

Deployment in Kubernetes can get complicated with a lot of manifests. Helm, Kustomize and the like are means to handle the complexity due to numerous manifests. GitOps tools such as FlexCD brings these tools under a single framework, and more importantly, implements the idea of using Git repository as source of truth for continuous deployment.

Kubernetes Admission Control

Fri, 07 Jan 2022 22:21:00 -0400

This post discusses admission control, and its implementation – the OPA Gatekeeper. I also discuss Azure Policy as a different Gatekeeper implementation.

Admission Webhooks

Admission controller intercepts requests to the Kubernetes API server after the request has been authenticated and authorized, and prior to persistence of the object into etcd store. There are many compiled-in controllers, which can be turned on and off on the node with the arguments of kube-apiserver process. For example, the ImagePolicyWebhook can be enabled with value ImagePolicyWebhook added to the –enable-admission-plugins switch. Its configuration can be provided via the –admission-control-config-file switch.

In addition to the compiled-in admission plugins (which must be configured for kube-apiserver process on the node), admission plugins can be developed as extensions and run as webhooks configured at runtime. This allows users to configure webhooks via API access, dynamically without having to restart kube-apiserver process on the Node, which is usually hard to do with managed Kubernetes platforms. They are therefore called Dynamic Admission Control.

You can define two types of admission webhooks in dynamic admission control: validating admission webhook, and mutating admission webhook. Their interaction with API server can be illustrated in the diagram below:

The mutating admission hook takes action to change the API request, whereas the validating admission hook accepts or denies the request.

A good example of mutating webhook is Istio’s sidecar injector. We can view the configuration with this command:

$ kubectl get MutatingWebhookConfiguration istio-sidecar-injector -o yaml | less

From the manifest returned, we can see that in this configuration the request is forwarded to istiod service on port 443, at path /inject for processing. We can also see some matching rules to find the target Pod creation API request.

Validating webhook can be display with the following call:

$ kubectl get ValidatingWebhookConfiguration

The output of validating webhook is a yes or no decision. We usually use validating webhook in conjunction with a policy engine to decide whether the request should be accepted or denied.

Open Policy Agent

Open Policy Agent (OPA) is an open-source general-purpose policy engine that applies policies written in Rego language to ingested JSON document and returns a result. It is usually integrated with system which requires a policy engine. For example, Kyverno is a policy engine designed for Kubernetes. Styra (one of the OPA contributors) develops policy engines to integrate with Istio’s authorization policy. They have online courses on OPA policy authoring and microservice authorization with their product.

OPA is build to be a general-purpose, unified way of solving policy and authorization problem. With microservice authorization, the activities includes decision making (determine action based on input, aka Policy Decision Point, PDP), and decision enforcement (issue 400 code or 200 code depending on decision, aka Policy Enforcement Point, PEP). OPA is introduced to decouple these two activities. OPA’s input is a JSON payload and it uses Policy in Rego language to come to decision.

The team that developers Open Policy Agent also created their controller (with OPA as the core component) to run validating web hook and mutating web hook. The original version is OPA-Kubernetes that uses kube-mgmt. This original version is also dubbed Gatekeeper v1.0. When OPA starts, the kube-mgmt sidecar container will load Kubernetes Namespace and Ingress objects into OPA. You can configure the sidecar to load any kind of Kubernetes object into OPA. The sidecar establishes watches on the Kubernetes API server so that OPA has access to an eventually consistent cache of Kubernetes objects. It has gone through a couple of major version changes as summarized in this section. As of today, when we deploy Gatekeeper we should use version 3.

Gatekeeper v3

Currently, Gatekeeper v3 is the most popular choice for Kubernetes Policy Controller. The diagram bellow illustrate how Gatekeeper integrates with Kubernetes API server.

Gatekeeper and Kubernetes

We can follow this guide to install Gatekeeper but the key step is as simple as to apply the correct version of manifest. Alternatively it can be installed using Helm. After the installation, we should see a Service named gatekeeper-webhook-service in the gatekeeper-system namespace. We can also inspect the newly created validationg web hook configuration

k get validatingwebhookconfiguration gatekeeper-validating-webhook-configuration -o yaml | less

The result indicates that the configuration forwards incoming manifests to the gatekeeper-webhook-service web service at the path /v1/admin for validation, and then at /v1/admitlabel for labelling. The configuration also stores rules as matching criteria.

We can smoke test Gatekeeper v3, with the basic example in its directory. Apply the template, constraint and then the manifests in resources. The pod creation will fail with an error like:

Error from server ([pod-must-have-gk] you must provide labels: {"gatekeeper"}): error when creating "resources/bad_pod_namespaceselector.yaml": admission webhook "validation.gatekeeper.sh" denied the request: [pod-must-have-gk] you must provide labels: {"gatekeeper"}

The gatekeeper document also covers the details of using ConstraintTemplate and Constraints. However, Writing your own a policy in Rego still takes time and we want to piggyback on the community for commonly used policies. OPA‘s gatekeeper-library projects keeps a handful of those in its library directory. We can test the privileged container example:

$ cd gatekeeper-library/library/pod-security-policy/privileged-containers
$ kustomize build . | kubectl apply -f -
constrainttemplate.templates.gatekeeper.sh/k8spspprivilegedcontainer created
$ kubectl apply -f samples/psp-privileged-container/example_disallowed.yaml
pod/nginx-privileged-disallowed created
$ kubectl delete -f samples/psp-privileged-container/example_disallowed.yaml
pod "nginx-privileged-disallowed" deleted
$ kubectl apply -f samples/psp-privileged-container/constraint.yaml
k8spspprivilegedcontainer.constraints.gatekeeper.sh/psp-privileged-container created
$ kubectl apply -f samples/psp-privileged-container/example_disallowed.yaml
Error from server ([psp-privileged-container] Privileged container is not allowed: nginx, securityContext: {"privileged": true}): error when creating "samples/psp-privileged-container/example_disallowed.yaml": admission webhook "validation.gatekeeper.sh" denied the request: [psp-privileged-container] Privileged container is not allowed: nginx, securityContext: {"privileged": true}

Currently the library directory contains two sub-directories, general and pod-scurity-policy. The latter is to regulate Pod creation, while the former includes more common usecases such as disable node port, enforce https, and enforce probes. This is the place I start with when building a policy.

The policy constraints take effect cluster wide. When we have multiple clusters, we would like a unified place to manage policies.

Azure Policy with AKS

We take Azure Policy with AKS as an example to illustrate how public cloud platform can simplify policy management. When building AKS cluster, an addon profile for Azure Policy can be installed. This allows Azure Policy to connect to the AKS cluster. Azure Policy contains many built-in policies definitions (as well as initiative definitions which are groups of related policies). We can simply search by Kubernetes keyword and look for the built-in policies. For example, there is a built-in policy definition “Kubernetes clusters should not allow container privilege escalation. The definitions (policy or initiative) can be assigned to a resource group with enforcement action set to denied, and with excluded namespaces, as shown in the screenshot below

The assignment can take as long as 10 minutes to push down to the cluster. Then we should be able to confirm by checking the constraint CRDs. We can see this This setup brings a centralized policy management system that can be easily hooked up to multiple clusters.

Other benefits of this architecture includes the ability to report compliance. As per CIS report for Azure AKS recommendation 4.3:

Azure Policy extends Gatekeeper v3, an admission controller webhook for Open Policy Agent (OPA), to apply at-scale enforcements and safeguards on your clusters in a centralized, consistent manner. It covers many basic resource types but does not cover any well-known CRDs. Azure Policy makes it possible to manage and report on the compliance state of your Kubernetes clusters from one place.

Checks with Azure Policy service for policy assignments to the cluster.
Deploys policy definitions into the cluster as constraint template and constraint custom resources.
Reports auditing and compliance details back to Azure Policy service.

As of February 2022, AWS EKS doesn’t seem to have the equivalent of this capability to integrate with a policy management. The only option would be to install Gatekeeper v3 yourself on the cluster, or host it separately.

Bottom line

Admission control should be a standard setup in Kubernetes deployment. When building gatekeeper system on your own, it can be set up separately on a different cluster. When Kubernetes is provided as a platform, it is very helpful for platform operator to manage their tenants. If the tenant is application development team, it also makes sense for them to develop their own policies for the developers in their team.

From Ingress to CRD: why my solution needs Istio Gateways on Kubernetes platforms

Wed, 29 Dec 2021 22:50:16 -0400

Update: also read my other article here on the different generations of ingress technologies.

In my Korthweb project I was researching for the best ingress mechanism for HTTP and TCP workload, both of which need to be secured. I started with Kubernetes Ingress but eventually decided to go with Istio Gateway. This blog post is about the justification. In this essay, I will make the distinction between Ingress and Gateway and explain why a Kubernetes platform needs the latter going forward.

The word ingress can be used either to indicate ingress resource (in conjunction with ingress controller) in the context of Kubernetes cluster, or more generally to indicate the technology (e.g. provided by service mesh) to direct north-south traffic, originated from the outside into the workload running within the cluster. I will use both meanings of the word ingress throughout the article.

Background

In my previous post, I discussed Kubernetes Service object and native Ingress. In short, a Service object addresses the problem of exposing a workload (Pod or Deployment), operating at layer 3-4. A ClusterIP type of service exposes workload within the cluster only, and therefore is only used by internal services that are consumed by workload in the same cluster. A NodePort type of service exposes workload to outside of the cluster, using the node’s IP address and port range available on the node, a great step forward but still quite inconvenient and subject to the limitation of using Node’s IP and Port. A LoadBalancer type of Service brings separate IP address and port for running a service. To back up this type of service, the platform has to provide a load balancer with its own IP address and port range to manage. The implementation is platform specific e.g. Metal LB for Minikube, Azure Load Balancer for AKS, NLB for AWS EKS. In this type of service, Node Ports still exists but are not exposed to the outside world. Instead, they are only exposed to the backend of Load Balancer, whose front-end port is exposed to the outside world. In both NodePort and LoadBalancer types of Service, the kube-proxy process plays a role on each node to direct traffic into NodePort to target Pods.

Kubernetes Ingress, on the other hand, targets issues above layer 4, for example, path-based routing and is therefore mostly used for HTTP and HTTPS traffic. It is implemented by an Ingress Controller and now there has been a diverse ecosystem of those ingress controllers. In many implementations (e.g. Azure Application Gateway Ingress Controller, AGIC), the ingress themselves usually come with a load balancer managed by themselves. This eliminates the need for a separate LoadBalancer type of Service just for L4 capability. As a result, Ingress (with both L4 and L7 capabilities) is usually deployed along with ClusterIP type Service. Here is an example. The declaration of the Ingress in this case usually contains numerous lines of annotations in order to communicate the specification to the implementation.

Requirement

Using Kubernetes Ingress along with Service of ClusterIP type seems perfect to address the majority of use cases. However, it has its blind spots. My Korthweb project deals with DICOM traffic (a protocol on top of TCP) over TLS as well as HTTP traffic, which can be broken down as:

The ability to proxy TCP traffic over an arbitrary TCP port
The ability to terminate TLS/SSL encryption for TCP traffic

The Ingress documentation of Kubernetes clearly states that: an Ingress does not expose arbitrary ports or protocols. Exposing services other than HTTP and HTTPS to the internet typically uses a service of type Service.Type=NodePort or Service.Type=LoadBalancer.

The stance of community-driven Nginx ingress controller can be found in the documentation, which suggests the use of Service object for arbitrary TCP port. There is some unofficial claims of workaround available but I’m not confident.

I also went through a number of other Ingress providers but to my disappointment, the only product that supports it seems to be Traefik:

Product	Requirement #1	Requirement #2
F5 driven Nginx Ingress Controller	Supported	There have also been requests for TLS termination for TCP traffic but the request has not been closed as of yet.
HA Proxy Ingress controller	Supported	There’s no mention of this in documentation.
Kong’s Kubernetes Controller (with TCPIngress CRD)	Supported	Documentation claims support through SNI-based routing. However, the example demonstrates it using self-signed certificate only. BYO cert not supported according to this GitHub issue.
Traefik Lab’s IngressRoute (with IngressRouteTCP CRD)	Supported	Documentation seems to suggest that it is supported by IngressRoute.

My general impression is that Req #2 isn’t very popular so the providers either don’t support it or delaying the implementation. Even if they do, the CRD used for TCP ingress is different than HTTP’s. For example with Traefik Lab, the CRD for TCP is IngressRouteTCP, and for HTTP it is IngressRoute.

Introduction to Gateway

In addition to functional shortages, according to this blog post, there are signs of fragmentation into different but strikingly similar CRDs and overloaded annotations. In Kubecon 2019, a group of contributors discussed the evolution of Ingress into Gateway. Below are the two key slides stolen from their presentation:

This sums up how the concept of Gateway is different from Ingress. Gateway is an instantiation of a given LB. It works along with Route to achieve the functions brought by an Ingress. Gateway as a resource type of its own makes management easier at L4-L6 by a separate team. Routing at L7 is offloaded to “Route” resource type.

This conceptual evolution gives rise to the Gateway API open source project managed by the SIG-NETWORK community. Gateway API is a collection of resources that model service networking in Kubernetes, including GatewayClass, Gateway, HTTPRoute, TCPRoute, Service etc. The aim of this initiative is to evolve Kubernetes service networking through expressive, extensive and role-oriented interfaces that are implemented by many vendors and have broad industry support.

The diagram above stolen from Gateway API website illustrate the management model for each resource.

Kubernetes Gateway Implementations

The Gateway API is still a fairly young initiative and all the reference implementations are either work-in-progress or in early stages. In the last section, we learned that in the journey from Ingress to Gateway, the standardization initiative comes a bit behind the implementation efforts. For many supporters, the natural strategy is to continue with existing proprietary ingress controller implementation, and retrofit their technology to the emerging Gateway API along the way.

Because of that, we can see many market players with multiple flavours of implementations, typically one that evolves from their original product offering, with higher adoption rate and maturity level, and one that conforms to Gateway API specification.

For example, Traefik Labs has its Gateway API implementation in experimental stage. Its own implementation consists of (standard) Kubernetes Ingress and Kubernetes IngressRoute (based on custom resource with support of advanced features such as TCP route). Another example is the HAProxy Ingress, a community driven ingress controller implementation for HAProxy. Starting from its version 0.13, it partially supports the Gateway API’s v1alpha1 specification. Here is the conformance statement. Contour as a CNCF project for ingress controller has support for Gateway API at alpha version. Kong’s Kubernetes Ingress Controller follows the same path.

The Gateway functionality is also provided as part of Service Mesh product offering, and we can see some reference implementation by service mesh providers. Istio has its own Gateway implementation but tries to adapt to Kubernetes Gateway API. Hashicorp Consul also claims to be building support for Kubernetes Gateway API.

Until the Gateway API project matures, it is not recommended to use Gateway implementations that conforms to it, unless you intend to be their Guinea Pig. For my project, I chose Istio Gateway.

Istio Gateway implementation

As discussed, when the Gateway standard is still in its infancy, I chose a non-standard implementation of Gateway, even though it may include some CRDs. Out of the many Gateway implementations, I choose Istio mainly for two reasons.

First, I need a Gateway as part of service mesh because service mesh provides many other features that are needed in the platform. One of the goals of Service Mesh is to provide commonly used features (traffic management, observability, security, extensibility) in a commodity layer on top of Kubernetes. Gateway is not the only thing I need out of this commodity layer. With one install of Istio, many common platform-level problems are also addressed (e.g. mTLS, traceability, etc). I’ve compared three major service mesh technologies as below:

Linkderd	Istio	Consul
– lightweight – uses linkerd2-proxy – the original service mesh – no Gateway implementation (deal breaker in my use case)	– feature rich – uses Envoy proxy – complex but getting better	– initially a service discovery and distributed key-value store – lacks observability features but getting better – uses Envoy proxy

It is worth-noting that there are some initiatives to standardize service mesh (e.g. SMI) with reference implementation such as OpenServiceMesh. The standard is too weak to be considered important for now compared with maturity and stability. Istio has strong community support. The risk with Istio to acknowledge, is that it is not following an open-governance model (unlike many other CNCF projects), which could potentially causes vendor lock-in.

Second, The Istio Gateway features the separation between Gateway and Virtual Service CRDs. The former defines entry point and the latter defines routing rules. This design separates entry points from routing rules, enabling the flexibility of reusing the same Virtual Service for different gateways.

Istio uses Envoy proxy to manage traffic between Pods. Unlike the kube-proxy pattern, the Envoy proxies are side-car containers centrally managed by Istio Control Plane, which also enables other features such as traceability, as illustrated in the diagram below (stolen from this post).

In addition to Virtual Service, Istio Gateway also has the concept of Destination Rules. Virtual Service defines how to route traffic to different destinations. Destination rule defines how to split traffic to different subset at the routing destination. The concepts are documented on this page. For HTTP traffic, the relevant entities can be represented in the diagram below:

Here is an example of using Gateway and Virtual Service resources (from Korthweb sample project). Also note that in the Istio literature, there is neither a CRD name called “Ingress”, nor a resource type named “Ingress Gateway”, although they may be loosely used to refer to “Gateway resources configured to manage ingress traffic”.

Istio Gateway Installation

There are more than one ways to install Istio. In the past, Istio Operator was used to install Istio. The Operator calls IstioOperator API. Today the use of Istio Operator is not recommended anymore but the IstioOperator API is used implicitly by Istioctl installer. The two recommended approaches to install Istio today is by Istioctl and Helm.

With istioctl, you can specify an option imperatively, or using an overlay file as did in this lab. With Helm, istio has multiple charts, and requires multiple steps:

install CRDs using the base chart
install istiod using the istiod chart. Here is an example of values provided to Helm installer.
install ingress gateway using the gateway chart. Here is an example of values provided to Helm installer for ingress gateway. Note that egress gateway also requires the same helm chart with different value definition.

This instruction contains how to manually install Istio gateways using Helm, including installation of multiple Helm charts. I attempted to create a single chart to consolidate the multiple charts required for istio. It was not successful because of an error when trying to reference the same gateway chart dependency for multiple times.

From Microservice to Service Mesh

Thu, 25 Nov 2021 00:31:19 -0400

We all know what microservice is now but how does service mesh assist with microservice development.

Microservice

Microservice as an architecture was firstly conceptualized in this article by Martin Fowler in 2014. It covers the pros (strong module boundaries, independent deployment, technology diversity) and cons (dealing with distributed system, eventual consistency, operational complexity). The reality is, many teams develops their product with the microservice architectural pattern.

The implementation of microservice architecture involves a lot of programming patterns, and tools. The creation of these patterns and tools are usually done in a separate dedicated project so developers can focus on business logics. When building software, developers only need to interact with libraries and frameworks. Libraries (e.g. log4j) provides dependencies, and developers needs to write code to call the libraries. On the other hand, frameworks (e.g. Spring, Flask) not only provides tools, but also implements a pattern. It addresses a set of common problems such as authentication, expose http service, logger and database connectivity. Once set up, the framework will call the code that developers write (unlike in libraries).

Spring – an example of Microservice framework

When it comes to microservice, a well-known appliction framwork is the Spring framework. It solves problems such as:

Application context and dependency injection (for Inversion of Control, or IOC)
Database access and transaction management
Expose rest APIs (using spring MVC)

There’s an entire ecosystem of projects under Spring framework. This framework is a huge system requiring a lot of configuration efforts. This is where Spring Boot helps.

Spring Boot makes it easy to create stand-alone, production-grade Spring based applications that you can just run. It features the “convention over configuration” paradigm to save programmers from boiler plate configuration. SpringBoot gives you a standalone application ready to run without complicated deployment steps.

Managing configuration in property files does not scale in the time of microservice. Spring Cloud provides configuration as a service (in line with everything else microservice framework). It doesn’t necessarily have to be hosted in the cloud. It is comparable to Apachee Zookeeper, Etcd (distributed key value store), Hashicorp Consul and Netflix OSS (Eureka, Ribbon, Hystrix). You can pull from Git repo. The mission of Spring Cloud is to eliminate boilerplate associated with distributed systems problems for Spring Boot applications.

Many developers use Spring Boot along with Spring Cloud to build microservices. This page contains a diagram for such architecture.

In this architecture, Spring cloud helps with service discovery, traffic routing, circuit-breaking, distributed tracing and monitoring. It can also act as API gateway (in place of Nginx).

API Gateway and API Management

Microservices relies on API. Let’s distinguish API gateway, and API management (this long post has some good information).

API Gateway is a microserivce pattern. The idea is a single point of entry for all clients. The API gateway either proxy an incoming request to the appropriate service, or it may fan out a request to multiple services. The other important aspect is the API gatway can expose a different API for reach client.

API Gateway Pattern

A variation of this pattern is the Backends for frontends pattern, where it defines a separate API gateway for each kind of client. The API Gateway may authenticate user and pass an Access Token containing information about the user to the services. It may use a circuit breaker to invoke services. To summarize, the key functions of an API Gateway in this pattern is:

Unified entry point for multiple API implementations
Protocol transformation
Request morphing
Client specific logics

This page from Azure has a good comparison between API Gateway pattern vs direct connection between client and microservice. Note that API Gateway can also refers to API Gateway product, which implements the functions above. For example

Spring Cloud Gateway
Solo.io Gloo
Netflix Zuul

API management acts as a proxy for an existing API implementations. Typical functions include:

AuthN and AuthZ
Service Discovery Ingreation
Load balancing (e.g. L7 path based routing)
Logging, tracing (track user), correlation
Response Caching
Retry policies, circuit breaker, QoS
Enforce policy
Track usage and monetization
metrics (duration)
rate limiting and throttling
Request morphing (header, query string and claims transformation)
IP whitelisting

API management are usually implemented as tightly controlled shared infrastructure owned by either a “platform team”, “integration team”, or other API infrastructure teams. Examples of API management product (including SaaS) are:

Google Cloud Apigee
Mulesoft
Kong

In real world, people often use API management produce and API gateway product interchangeably.

Service Mesh

Many dub Service Mesh the next generation of Microservice. So what is the relationship between microservice and service mesh. The Microservice architectural pattern creates the need for API gateway pattern. To address this pattern, the API Gateway products first emerged. Service mesh emerged later. Service mesh and API gateway have a common set of features.

In this presentation (a tale of two frameworks) from 2018 (early days of service mesh), two teams discussed microservice (spring cloud) and service mesh (istio) approaches. There is a slide about when to use which. Many teams since have moved to Service Mesh for feature richness. This is a case study from 2021.

There are a number of service mesh technologies, such as Consul, Isito and Linkerd. Here is a comparison chart. Even though all those projects are open-source, there is some competition already. Linkerd is the first to bring up the concept of service mesh in this blog. It also purportedly has better performance than Istio. However, it does not use Envoy proxy. Istio is good at marketing. It has higher adoption rate and is feature rich. However, Google did not donate Istio project to CNCF as many expected. Instead, it created its own governing body, the Open Usage Commons. The Istio is not an open-governance project, which potentially diverge from CNCF in the future [1]. Hashicorp Consul initially was built for service discovery and distributed key/value store. It supports Kubernetes and VM. However, it still lacks observability features.

Apart from the three major technologies, other players tries to push for standardization of service mesh. The most influential initiative is the SMI (service mesh interface), pushed by Microsoft. The idea is a separation of standard and implementation, so late players will have a chance. OpenServiceMesh is Microsoft’s reference implementation of SMI. The SMI is something to watch for but it remains pretty week thus far. Google’s platform has Anthos Service Mesh which is a commercial distribution based on Istio. AWS has its own AppMesh technology, also using Envoy proxy.

[1] Update from Apr 25, 2022 – Istio applied to become CNCF project.

Istio Lab – Ingress and Egress

Tue, 16 Nov 2021 21:28:00 -0400

Istio is a popular open-source service mesh implementation using Envoy proxy. One of the benefit of using Istio is the ingress and egress it brings to native Kubernetes platform. This article is a hands-on guide to test Istio ingress and egress gateways on Minikube. It was tested on my MacBook. All the information in this post can be found in several different pages from Istio and Minikube documentation. The purpose of this article is a single cheat sheet for myself to quickly set up Istio ingress and egress testing.

Install Istio on Minikube

We start with configuring Minikube on MacBook (or change the command accordingly on other platform), and install metal LB load balancer. The steps with Istio also works with a regular Kubernetes platform.

minikube start --memory=12288 --cpus=6 --kubernetes-version=v1.20.2 --nodes 3 --container-runtime=containerd --driver=hyperkit
minikube addons enable metallb

Then we need to give load balancer an IP address range before setting up the load balancer. Minikube adds an interface named bridge100 to MacOS host environment. The IP address of the host can be found via the following command:

minikube ssh "ping host.minikube.internal -c 1"

For example, my host IP address is 192.168.64.1, so I dedicate the IP range 192.168.64.64 to 192.168.64.80 to the MetalLB load balancer. Then I need to provide this range when configuring the load balancer:

minikube addons configure metallb
kubectl -n metallb-system get po

After the configuration, make sure the MetalLB pod is up. Then we can install istio to the Kubernetes cluster. The steps are completed using istioctl following the instruction, I created a quick and dirty script to put the steps together:

#! /bin/bash
curl -L https://istio.io/downloadIstio | sh -
export PATH=$(realpath istio*/bin):$PATH
ln -sfn $(ls -d -- istio-*) istio
if istioctl x precheck; then
 echo ready to install istio and lable namespace for istio-injection
 istioctl install --set profile=demo -y --verify --set meshConfig.outboundTrafficPolicy.mode=REGISTRY_ONLY
 kubectl label namespace default istio-injection=enabled
else
 echo failed precheck
 exit 1
fi

The script above download the istio zip file, unzips it, installs Istio (in demo mode and set outboundTrafficPolicy to REGISTRY_ONLY), labels default namespace for proxy injection. To use istioctl without spelling out full path, we can run the following command again separately outside of script:

export PATH=$(realpath istio/bin):$PATH

To validate, check istioctl version command.

Install Sample application

For simplicity, the rest of this article uses httpbin to test Istio’s ingress and egress. For completeness, this section gives the steps to install bookinfo application as it is used in other Istio testing as well. It also help understand how to ingress to an application with Istio using an IP provided by the load balancer. Skip this section if just need to test with the simple httpbin application. The Bookinfo application comes within the istio 1.12 directory. In the following steps from the istio directory, we install some observability add-ons as well as the bookinfo application. Then we test access to the website.

kubectl apply -f samples/addons/prometheus.yaml
kubectl apply -f samples/addons/kiali.yaml
kubectl apply -f samples/addons/jaeger.yaml
kubectl apply -f samples/addons/grafana.yaml

kubectl apply -f samples/bookinfo/platform/kube/bookinfo.yaml
kubectl apply -f samples/bookinfo/networking/bookinfo-gateway.yaml

kubectl exec "$(kubectl get pod -l app=ratings -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.name}')" -c ratings -- curl -sS productpage:9080/productpage | grep -o "<title>.*</title>"

export INGRESS_HOST=$(kubectl -n istio-system get service istio-ingressgateway -o jsonpath='{.status.loadBalancer.ingress[0].ip}')
export INGRESS_PORT=$(kubectl -n istio-system get service istio-ingressgateway -o jsonpath='{.spec.ports[?(@.name=="http2")].port}')
export GATEWAY_URL=$INGRESS_HOST:$INGRESS_PORT
curl -s "http://${GATEWAY_URL}/productpage" | grep -o "<title>.*</title>"

On my laptop, the value of $GATEWAY_URL is 192.168.64.64:80. Therefore I can browse to site http://192.168.64.64:80/productpage with local browser. We can also check kiali dashboard:

istioctl dashboard kiali

Then we are good to examine ingress and egress.

Prep Work

The following custom resources are related to traffic management in istio:

Virtual Service (vs)
Destination Rule (dr)
Service Entry (se)
Gateway (gw, Istio’s ingress or egress)

We will expand on the role of each in a separate article. To execute command from within a Pod, we also use sleep application which is essentially a Pod with a sleeper thread for the purpose allowing user to run troubleshooting command. The sleep application is provided in istio directory:

kubectl apply -f samples/sleep/sleep.yaml
kubectl get po -l app=sleep

Find out the Pod name to execute command. Then we use httpbin website to emulate an external service, and use the sleep Pod (suppose the name is sleep-557747455f-q99cz) to access the service:

kubectl exec -it sleep-557747455f-q99cz -c sleep -- curl http://httpbin.org/headers

As we previously set outboundTrafficPolicy.mode=REGISTRY_ONLY, this step is expected to output nothing. If this is not the case, it means the cluster may have ALLOW_ALL as outbount traffic policy, and you will need to follow this guide to set it to REGISTRY_ONLY. With REGISTRY_ONLY, in order to allow access, we need to register a service entry, by applying the document below:

apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1alpha3
kind: ServiceEntry
metadata:
 name: httpbin
spec:
 hosts:
 - httpbin.org
 ports:
 - number: 80
 name: http
 protocol: HTTP
 resolution: DNS

Now we should be able to access httpbin service as it is registered:

kubectl get se httpbin -o yaml

Using the exec command above again, we should see output from the curl command.

Ingress Testing

We deploy an httpbin service in order to test ingress. The YAML declaration is prepared by Istio installation package:

kubectl apply -f samples/httpbin/httpbin.yaml

Then we deploy the ingress:

apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1alpha3
kind: Gateway
metadata:
 name: httpbin-gateway
spec:
 selector:
 istio: ingressgateway
 servers:
 - port:
 number: 80
 name: http
 protocol: HTTP
 hosts:
 - "httpbin.digihunch.com"

The selector above indicates that the gateway deployed to a Pod labeled with istio: ingressgateway. Then we create a corresponding virtual service for this gateway:

apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1alpha3
kind: VirtualService
metadata:
 name: httpbin
spec:
 hosts:
 - "httpbin.digihunch.com"
 gateways:
 - httpbin-gateway
 http:
 - match:
 - uri:
 prefix: /status
 - uri:
 prefix: /delay
 route:
 - destination:
 port:
 number: 8000
 host: httpbin

Note that the hosts setup must match the configuration in gateway. The virtual service defines two services at URIs /status and /delay to expose, and we can confirm the creation of virtual service:

kubectl get vs httpbin -o yaml

We can then test with curl command from MacOS host to verify that the ingress is working. We need to use the IP address of the service (192.168.64.64 with port 80 as previously indicated):

curl -I -HHost:httpbin.digihunch.com http://192.168.64.64/status/200
curl -I -HHost:httpbin.digihunch.com http://192.168.64.64/delay/2

We use -HHost to emulate this request going to httpbin.digihunch.com (otherwise we’d have to fake DNS entry in /etc/hosts). Both command should give their return without error. The second command will give return after a delay of 2 seconds.

This validates the success of ingress setup.

Egress Testing

To visit an external service, there are four options:

Just access external service from Pods, when you have global.outboundTrafficPolicy.mode=ALLOW_ANY
Use ServiceEntry (as illustrated above in Prep Work)
Bypass envoy proxy (not recommended, because there is no role of service mesh)
Configure an Egress Gateway

In the Prep Work, we’ve seen how to use Service Entry. However, there is no control of how Pods access the external service. We are going to configure an Egress Gateway to manage the outgoing traffic flow. This allows you to manage route, and apply observability features to the outgoing traffic, something the Service Entry alone will not provide. The egress gateway have two typical use cases as explained on Istio website.

First, we want to confirm that the egress pod exists, with a quick command:

kubectl get po -n istio-system -l app=istio-egressgateway && kubectl get se

It should exist as we installed istio as demo version. We then also need a service entry, as we have already configured in Prep Work. At this point, the egress gateway resource has not been created.

Now, in a separate terminal, we monitor the log of egress pod

kubectl logs -f istio-egressgateway-7d5d69dcfd-kvwxv -n istio-system

With the -f (follow) session on, if we visit external service as we did during Prep Work, there is no new entry pop up at the tail of the log. This is because the external access is still not managed by egress. Now we need to add egress, with the following resources applied:

apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1alpha3
kind: Gateway
metadata:
 name: istio-egressgateway
spec:
 selector:
 istio: egressgateway
 servers:
 - port:
 number: 80
 name: http
 protocol: HTTP
 hosts:
 - httpbin.org

Then we setup the virtual service with related rules:

apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1alpha3
kind: VirtualService
metadata:
 name: vs-for-egressgateway
spec:
 hosts:
 - "httpbin.org"
 gateways:
 - istio-egressgateway
 - mesh
 http:
 - match:
 - gateways:
 - mesh
 port: 80
 route:
 - destination:
 host: istio-egressgateway.istio-system.svc.cluster.local
 subset: httpbin
 port:
 number: 80
 weight: 100
 - match:
 - gateways:
 - istio-egressgateway
 port: 80
 route:
 - destination:
 host: httpbin.org
 port:
 number: 80
 weight: 100

---
apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1alpha3
kind: DestinationRule
metadata:
 name: dr-for-egressgateway
spec:
 host: istio-egressgateway.istio-system.svc.cluster.local
 subsets:
 - name: httpbin

With all applied, we can repeat the access command using curl, and watch for the log tail.

kubectl exec -it sleep-557747455f-q99cz -c sleep -- curl http://httpbin.org/ip

The log should output a line saying curl command access, which indicates that this outbound access is managed by istio egress gateway. The log line looks like below and in the example the IP address 10.244.2.4 is the Pod IP address.

[2021-11-22T01:22:47.547Z] "GET /ip HTTP/2" 200 - via_upstream - "-" 0 45 818 816 "10.244.2.9" "curl/7.80.0-DEV" "9ec0a193-77f0-90a5-b132-21c3259307da" "httpbin.org" "3.216.167.140:80" outbound|80||httpbin.org 10.244.2.4:42372 10.244.2.4:8080 10.244.2.9:52710 - -

Looking at the virtual service declaration, you might noticed multiple routes in the virtual service. The first route (mesh) tells sidecars to route request to egress gateway. The second route (istio-egressgateway) tells egress gateway to route traffic to external service as destination.

In real life, there’s more to consider. For example, we usually want the host to allow on egress to be a wild card host such as *.api.google.com. While the hosts field in virtual service can be wild card, the route destination in virtual service has to be a list of fully qualified domains. The other situation is the destination website may issue an HTTP redirect to a different host, which also needs to be registered as a destination. These details can add up to administrative effort.

Egress example

An other real life scenario is the use of authorization policy. Authorization policy rules use SPIFEE identity of a Pod. If a Pod initiates egress connection to destination host in TLS, then the Pod’s SPIFFEE identity and its identity for external TLS connection are in conflict.

With Azure AKS

The steps above also works on other cloud platform such as AKS. This is an AKS cluster that I tested the steps. The Terraform code provisions a private cluster, as well as a Bastion Host. From the Bastion host, we can perform the same steps as above.

When Istio gets installed, it will created a Service object called istio-ingressgateway in the istio-system namespace. The service is of load balancer type and by default will create a public load balancer in Azure AKS.

The test steps will also work for private load balancers. To tell Azure to create private load balancer on a specific subnet, the Service object needs to include annotation. We have to customize Istio installation in order to do that, using the following overlay file (azoverlay.yaml):

apiVersion: install.istio.io/v1alpha2
kind: IstioControlPlane
metadata:
 namespace: istio-operator
 name: custom-istiocontrolplane
spec:
 profile: demo
 values:
 gateways:
 istio-ingressgateway:
 serviceAnnotations:
 service.beta.kubernetes.io/azure-load-balancer-internal: "true"
 service.beta.kubernetes.io/azure-load-balancer-internal-subnet: "suitable-porpoise-lb-subnet"

This is inspired by this post. Then the command to install Istio becomes:

istioctl install -f azoverlay.yaml -y --verify --set meshConfig.outboundTrafficPolicy.mode=REGISTRY_ONLY

This concludes the hand-on guide for Istio ingress and egress labs. I will need to write another post explaining the related concepts.